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Our fathers wrung their bread from stocks and stones
And fenced their gardens with the Redman's bones
-Robert Lowell, "Children of Light"

O

INTRODUCTION

N March 27, 1963, a pair of reporters from the New York
Times and Newsweek, Claude Sitton and Karl Fleming, arrived in Greenwood, Mississippi,' a small town on the banks of the
Yazoo River that was becoming the front line in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee's campaign to register black voters. Sitton and Fleming reached Greenwood shortly after police
with shotguns and a German shepherd had attacked 150 nonviolent
protesters in front of the Leflore County courthouse.2 In the hours
that followed, groups of whites roamed the streets, openly contemplating lynching and murder.3 The reporters had traveled as a pair
and dressed in Brooks Brothers suits on the theory that a mob
would not attack men who looked like FBI agents,' but no one was
'Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63, at 719-20
(1988); Oral History Interview by Leslie Jack with Karl Fleming, Civil Rights and the
Press Symposium, at 4, http://civilrightsandthepress.syr.edu/pdfs/Karl%20Fleming.pdf
(last visited Dec. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Fleming Oral History]; see also Karl Fleming,
Son of the Rough South: An Uncivil Memoir 290, 295-96 (2005) [hereinafter Fleming,
Son of the Rough South].
2
Branch, supra note 1, at 719-20.
'Id. at 720; Claude Sitton, Police Break Up Negroes' Rally, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28,
1963, at 4.
4 Fleming Oral History, supra note
1, at 3.
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fooled that day. When Fleming began snapping pictures for Newsweek, they were immediately surrounded by some twenty "roughly-dressed, sullen men on the court house side walk." 5 "You niggerloving son-of-a-bitch," one said to Fleming, "I could use that camera strap to hang your ass."6 Another man looked at Sitton, the
Times reporter, and uttered one of the most haunting lines ever
committed to paper during the civil rights era: "We killed twomonths old Indian babies to take this country and now they want
us to give it away to the Niggers."7
Histories and memoirs have described the comment as "menacing" and "chilling," like something out of Faulkner.8 Taylor Branch
was so struck by the line that he quoted it in two of the three volumes of his classic account of the civil rights movement.9 For words
spoken on the spur of the moment by a member of an angry, ignorant mob, they are remarkably complex. What does it mean, "We
killed two-months old Indian babies to take this country and now
they want us to give it away to the Niggers"? While at least one
scholar has quoted the line as a reflection on the South's violent
past,1° at its core it is a statement rooted in the present-day language of entitlement. By the speaker's reasoning, "this country"Greenwood, Leflore County, the Delta, all of Mississippi, and the
'Sitton, supra note 3.
'Fleming Oral History, supra note 1, at 4. In Fleming's memoir, the threat is, "We
could use that goddamned camera strap to hang you with. You better git out of
Greenwood." Fleming, Son of the Rough South, supra note 1, at 295. Claude Sitton
reported it as, "that a camera strap would make a dammed good noose to hang you
with." Sitton, supra note 3.
7 Sitton, supra note 3. Karl Fleming would remember the encounter slightly differently: "And then this guy says to Claude, 'Our grandparents killed Indian babies to
take this country, and now they're trying to make us give it to the niggers."' Fleming
Oral History, supra note 1,at 4. In Fleming's memoir, the quote is, "Our grandfathers
killed two-month-old Indian babies to take this country, and now they want us to give
it away to the niggers." Fleming, Son of the Rough South, supra note 1, at 295.
'Seth Cagin & Philip Dray, We Are Not Afraid: The Story of Goodman,
Schwerner, and Chaney, and the Civil Rights Campaign for Mississippi 193 (1988);
Mae Miller Claxton, Outlaws and Indians: Eudora Welty's "Border" Characters in
Delta Wedding, in Eudora Welty's Delta Wedding 123, 130-31 (Reine Dugas Bouton
ed., 2008); James C. Cobb, The Most Southern Place on Earth: The Mississippi Delta
and the Roots of Regional Identity 237 (1992); see also John Lewis with Michael
D'Orso, Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement 248 (1998).
9Branch, supra note 1, at 718; Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire: America in the King
Years, 1963-65, at 68 (1998).
" Claxton, supra note 8, at 131.
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South-belongs to the mob. While his comments carry the heavy
threat of violent resistance to any attempt at redistribution, they
also imply that redistribution would be unfair, even absurd.
What is the basis for this sense of entitlement? It is not adequately explained by conventional accounts of property rights. The
speaker admits that the people he describes as "we"-the Greenwood mob or, more generally, Mississippi whites opposed to African American voting rights-were not the first people to claim
ownership of the area." Nor does the claim derive from labor in the
land; 2 the entitlement hinges on a far more suspect kind of effort.
The speaker's words are too specific to suggest acquisition from
the original Native American owners through conquest or "discovery"; the Delta did not belong to the lynch mob because a tribe was
defeated, bought out, or removed by the federal government. 3 The
mob was not tracing title to the early nineteenth-century speculators who, legitimately or not, bought the "Yazoo lands" that constituted Alabama and Mississippi from the State of Georgia." Rather,
the mob looked to ancestors who acquired the land by killing "twomonths old Indian babies." The mob's claim is rooted in atrocity.
As a reflexive matter, it may be tempting to regard this notion as
unworthy of discussion-the ravings of a violent racist. The law
" See Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquests &
Possession to Democracy & Equal Opportunity, 86 Ind. L.J. 763, 766 (2011) ("[T]itle
to land in the United States rests on the forced taking of land from first possessorsthe very opposite of respect for first possession.").
" The supposed inability or unwillingness of Native Americans to exploit the land
was a traditional, if erroneous, basis for justifying its taking. See, e.g., Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823) ("[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this
country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to
leave the country a wilderness."); Jedediah Purdy, The Meaning of Property: Freedom, Community, and the Legal Imagination 41-42 (2010) (discussing Locke's understanding of aboriginal versus settler claims); see also Stuart Banner, How the Indians
Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier 46-48, 187 (2005) (describing
Locke's views as inconsistent with early settlers' acknowledgment of Indian agriculture, and Marshall's account of colonial land acquisition in Johnson v. M'Intosh as
"wildly inaccurate").
13 The statement implies that the original owners were in possession
at the time their
land was taken from them, and it ignores the niceties of whether the Native Americans were using the land in a permanently settled way or whether the federal government had extinguished the original Indian title.
" See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 87-89 (1810); Banner, supra note
12, at 171.
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would never recognize murder as the basis for property." But the
idea that terrible crimes could create claims of entitlement-the
sense, however implausible, that the worst wrongs give rise to the
most enduring rights-has an undeniable, if unexplained, place in
American law. On one level, it is widely understood that property
owners will use violence to protect the rights they already have.
Judges routinely anticipate that people will resort to deadly force
over even the most picayune trespasses. 6 This possibility of violence suggests to some courts that tough, unambiguous penalties
against trespassers are necessary to avoid a rash of vigilantism.17 At
the same time, most states allow people in their homes to kill intruders under circumstances that traditionally would have been
murder. The logic behind "castle doctrine" assumes that so many
otherwise law-abiding men and women would use deadly force in
such circumstances that excusing these homicides is necessary to
keep the law legitimately in line with social practice. 8 People
commit these acts of violence, we postulate, because they have
such a strong investment, material and emotional, in their property. They will die for their property, so they will kill for it. 9
A related, but very different kind of question emerges from the
notion that murdering "Indian babies" could form a basis for entitlement. The view from Greenwood, Mississippi, suggests that
while a connection to property may well drive violence over it, the
" Cf. Tracey B. Cobb, Comment, Making a Killing: Evaluating the Constitutionality
of the Texas Son of Sam Law, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1483, 1485 (2003) (describing how
more than forty states and the federal government have enacted "Son of Sam" statutes forbidding convicted criminals from profiting from the notoriety of their crimes).
16 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154,
161 (Wis. 1997)
("Although dueling is rarely a modern form of self-help, one can easily imagine a
frustrated landowner taking the law into his or her own hands when faced with a brazen trespasser, like Steenberg, who refuses to heed no trespass warnings.").
7Id. at 160-61.
See D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev. 255,
259-61 (2006) [hereinafter Barros, Home]; D. Benjamin Barros, Legal Questions for
the Psychology of Home, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 645, 648-51 (2009).
19Compare Barros, Home, supra note 18, at 259-76 (describing the strong protections from invasion given to homeowners, as well as the deep psychological connection between homeowners and their property), with Margaret Jane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 991-92, 996-1000 (1982) (describing the home
as a "moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of association," thereby
making it "an insult for the state to invade one's home because it is the scene of one's
history and future, one's life and growth").
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converse can also be true: killing fosters a connection to property.
The mob's ancestors killed for the land, so now the mob will die for
it.

This Article explores how people identify with their property
when they have committed hurtful and harmful acts in its acquisition and use. The inverted correlation between ownership and violence complicates a dominant view in legal scholarship that property creates or reinforces "personhood," a "value" in property law
that has long been equated with autonomy, dignity, and basic civil
rights. Rooted in Hegel's Philosophy of Right," given concrete
form by a century of psychological literature," and canonized in legal thought in a classic 1982 article by Professor Margaret Jane
Radin,22 personhood theory views property as necessary for an in'
dividual "to achieve proper self-development-to be a person."23
Because people are "bound up" in their property, it has a crucial
"human flourishing" function 24 as well as a central role in the progression "from abstract autonomy to full development of the individual in the context of the family and the state., 25 As a result, personhood presents what Radin calls a "moral basis" for resolving
legal questions across a broad range of property-related doctrines,
separate and apart from categorical defenses of the right to exclude
or utilitarian justifications for particular allocations of rights and
uses.26 For thirty years, scholars have viewed Radin's insights as an
alternative from the left to traditional, more utilitarian and economically focused property theories.
2

Radin, supra note 19, at 971-78.
Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 770

21See

(2009).
' Radin, supra note 19, at 971-78.
2
3 Id. at 957.
' Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law,
94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 748 (2009) (equating "human flourishing" with "enabl[ing]
individuals to live lives worthy of human dignity").
' Radin, supra note 19, at 972.
26
Id. at 959, 991-1013. For a brief discussion of the property doctrines engaged in
Radin's article, see infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., David L. Rosendorf, Homelessness and the Uses of Theory: An Analysis
of Economic and Personality Theories of Property in the Context of Voting Rights
and Squatting Rights, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 701, 708-12 (1990-1991); Jeanne Schroeder, Three's A Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and Melamed's One View of
the Cathedral,84 Cornell L. Rev. 394, 404 n.31 (1999).
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It is undoubtedly true that many people derive great satisfaction
and a sense of personhood from exercising their property rights in
socially and environmentally responsible ways and from contributing to the interests and aspirations of a broader community. 2 At
the same time, this Article suggests that when conflicts over ownership and use arise, even harmful conduct can become conflated
with the rights of ownership and with people's identities as owners.
These moments when violence and pain intensify the bond between people and their property reveal how personhood does not
always have a progressive valence. It presents itself less as a value
that should be recognized-a basis for decision making-than as a
set of challenges for property law to navigate as it seeks to define
and protect individual rights and obligations in a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic society.
The connection between violence and personhood has deep
roots in the American experience, extending back to the earliest
colonial encounters between Europeans and Native Americans,
and it continues today at a less cataclysmic level in everyday conflicts involving property owners, their neighbors, and the government. If colonial violence played a role in establishing a cultural
value that encouraged personal identification with property, 29 today's conflicts show how personhood remains a complicated product of ownership that can defy easy categorization as good or bad.
In writing about the connection between violence and personhood, I discuss a broad spectrum of conduct, from historical massacres to the most commonplace unneighborly acts. To reflect this
conceptual range, I call the personhood that arises from nasty conduct the "atrocity value" in property. It is a phrase that encompasses the worst acts imaginable-what the Oxford English Dictionary terms "horrible or heinous wickedness"-as well as acts
that are merely "atrocious," or "violations of taste or good manners." ' If "atrocity" appears to be a hyperbolic way to describe,
say, unsightly landscaping that dismays the neighbors, it captures
' See Alexander, supra note 24, at 748.
2 The link between violence and a national property tradition is not limited to the
United States. Analogies are readily available to the South African, Australian and
New Zealand, and Israeli experiences. See Jeremy Waldron, Settlement, Return, and
the Supersession Thesis, 5 Theoretical Inq. L. 237, 260-61 (2004).
" Atrocity Definition, 1 Oxford English Dictionary 757 (2d ed. 1989).
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the vehemence with which people fight over such matters and the
significance that keeping a ratty couch in the yard can attain with
regard to how owners see their property and themselves.
In questioning personhood's progressive valence, this Article
develops three insights about personhood and the American property tradition. First, I argue that personhood is more pervasive and
deeply rooted in American property law than most scholars have
realized because it is not limited to doctrinal areas associated with
progressive goals for property. If personhood is fostered by bad
conduct, in cases where "human flourishing" and "the freedom to
live one's life on one's own terms" through property ownership is a
function of mistreating others, it becomes much more difficult to
resolve property disputes on the basis of personhood. 31 There will
always be winners, and there will always be losers-and in some
cases the winners will value their property precisely because there
are losers. Progressive theorists have declared that "[p]roperty
law can render relationships within communities either exploitative
and humiliating or liberating and ennobling., 33 In cases in which
the humiliating and ennobling aspects of property are two sides of
the same coin, the absence of a stated goal of promoting personhood-related to what Professor Henry Smith describes as the indirect connection between ends and means in property law-has
allowed property law to domesticate and resolve even the most inflamed conflicts within an institution that promotes order, predictability, and cooperation.'
Second, this Article seeks to refine one sense of how property
works in American society. It is often said that property is a social
institution.35 But so is a pogrom. Social institutions do not have to
31Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 Cornell L.
Rev. 743,743 (2009).

32This

is not just a question of how attention to relative status causes people to "in-

vest the individual relationship with the material things of the world with a potentially
dysfunctional regard for other people's property," as Professor Nestor Davidson has
perceptively reasoned. See Davidson, supra note 21, at 798-99. In Part I, infra, I suggest additional reasons why personhood may spring from hurting others.
33
Alexander et al., supra note 31, at 744.
Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means
in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 959, 959, 971-74 (2009).
" See Joseph William Singer, The Edges of the Field: Lessons on the Obligations of
Ownership 3 (2000); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 73, 81-88 (1985) [hereinafter Rose, Possession]; Carol M. Rose, The Comedy
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be sociable; violence can also be constitutive of communities." But
property regimes are not violent. They often reveal human behavior at its most inspiring. They require, as Professor Carol Rose observed, a great deal of cooperation, enough in fact to call into question classical assumptions of rational utility-maximizing.37 Property
is a sociable institution despite the high stakes of conflicts over itnot just economic stakes, but deeply personal stakes on both sides
of an issue. One of the achievements of property law is the way
that it contains personhood, turning threats to the regime into occasions that strengthen it." While property law tends to check
much of the most atrocious behavior, the decisions often turn on
questions that are independent of whether the litigants' conduct is
good or bad or whether they are deriving the right kind of personhood from their property. Not basing decisions on personhood can
mean that some people succeed in getting a right to be hurtful, unneighborly, or worse. But more often, it means that property law
can guide and govern people who are invested in atrocious exercises of ownership without directly attacking their personhood or
otherwise defining them as outsiders to the regime.
Third, acknowledging the atrocity value in property may help
explain some of the deep-seated resistance of many Americans to
particular reforms that privilege social obligation or, more broadly,

of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 711, 711-12 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, Comedy].
3' In a groundbreaking study of the relationships of Jews, Christians, and Muslims in
fourteenth-century Aragon, the historian David Nirenberg advocated normalizing
and contextualizing the study of violence, of recognizing "a constructive relationship
between conflict and coexistence." David Nirenberg, Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages 9 (1996). "[V]iolence and aggression are
forms of association," Nirenberg wrote. "Even wars ... are forms of interaction that
seek to establish relations, not destroy them. As Georg Simmel put it: 'In contrast
to... pure negativity, conflict contains something positive. Its positive and negative
aspects, however, are integrated; they can be separated conceptually, but not empirically."' Id. at 9-10.
"' Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 37, 51 (1990).
" While other areas of law also succeed in cabining threats to their legitimacymost notably criminal law's establishment of a "monopoly of violence," Robert M.
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1614 (1986)-one of the keys to
property's success is that it often resolves personally fraught conflicts without addressing personhood directly. See infra Part III.
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eliminate externalities.39 There are many ways to account for the
widespread hostility to environmental measures and other forms of
regulation. We often presume it is because regulation prompts
people to imagine that the government will come for their property
next.' There is widespread denial that certain problems such as
global warming exist, and, for a variety of reasons, many see the
government as an outside entity that will never represent or consider their interests." But individuals are also capable of contemplating externalities and collective responsibility. The atrocity
value that shadows personhood suggests how polluting uses can
become indistinguishable from the meaning of a property right and
of ownership itself. Property law's success in realizing certain progressive "human flourishing" goals will turn on how it acknowledges and works with manifestations of personhood that run contrary to those goals.42
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the centrality and progressive valence of personhood as a conception of property and sketches out a case for why atrocity might foster beliefs of
entitlement, gesturing towards Radin's own "intuitive account" of
personhood. However, instead of rooting my discussion in Hegel as
Radin did, I turn to social psychology and accounts of law and violence to show how bad acts committed in the course of acquiring
and owning property can create a deep connection between owner
and land.43 In Part II, I attempt to historicize personhood in the

39
See, e.g., Ilya Somin, The Politics of Economic Development Takings, 58 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 1185, 1190-91 (2008). For a classic example of judicial hostility to environmental regulation, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1031-32 (1992).
'See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall,

or any farm with a factory.").
" Cf. Amitai Etzioni, The Socio-Economics of Property, in To Have Possessions: A
Handbook on Ownership and Property 465, 467 (Floyd W. Rudmin ed., 1991)
("When I ask Americans which is a more serious crime: stealing the car of a neighbor,
a corporation, or the government, they typically rank the government car last ....
They treat the government as if it were that of a foreign occupying force rather than
an instrument of the community.").
5ee Smith, supra note 34, at 973-74.
, 3This is not to say that personhood is always a product of violence and pain. Property ownership is often ennobling for individuals and communities. But it is very diffi-
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American property tradition. I focus on the Puritan settlement of
Massachusetts and the origins of a peculiarly American identification with property: what made it possible for English settlers to
embrace the land rather than resist the wilderness. I suggest that
personhood was a feature of ownership without moral valence: the
product of cooperation and community-building with Native
Americans, but also of genocidal conflict with them. As a primary
case study, I examine King Philip's War, a conflict in 1675-76 that
echoed for hundreds of years in the Indian wars that moved westward across the continent.' In Part III, I survey how atrocity continues to foster personhood in an array of contexts involving common ownership, exclusion, and use. I argue that property law is
often successful in promoting "human flourishing" and cooperation
when it does not attempt to decide cases on the basis of a personhood value in property.
I. INTUITIONS OF PERSONHOOD: MAKING SENSE OF THE ATROCITY
VALUE

In the three decades since Margaret Jane Radin published Property and Personhood, personhood has emerged as an essential lens
for viewing property.45 Some of the most compelling recent works
of property scholarship have built on Radin's insights to explore
the American property tradition and progressive property theory.4"
But the connection between atrocity and personhood challenges at
a basic level how personhood has been commonly understood and
applied. This Part examines the assumption that personhood is a
progressive value in property, considers the legacy of Radin's work
in contemporary scholarship, and then draws on psychological litcult to distinguish innocent from atrocious personhood, and the cultural importance
that Americans attach to personhood in property is rooted in violence.
"Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American
Identity, at xiii (1998); Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860, at 79 (1973).
41See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in
the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 Duke L.J. 1047, 1054-56 & accompanying notes (2007) (describing personhood as a "leading approach to property").
46As a general matter, I share the aspirations of A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 31, at 743, and believe that understanding why such a vision is bound
to be resisted is crucial to moving the law in a progressive direction.
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erature and cultural and legal theory to explain the link between
atrocity and personhood.
A. The ProgressiveValence and Legacy of Personhood
The connection between atrocity and personhood-what I call
the "atrocity value" in property-is not obvious. Although Radin's
article does not assign an overt political valence to personhood, the
piece implicitly suggests one when it discusses how personhood
manifests itself in and can be applied to legal issues. According to
Radin, personhood buttresses the right to privacy and the sanctity
of the home, 7 supports residential tenants' rights relating to termination and warranties of habitability, 8 privileges physical takings
over regulatory takings, 9 justifies free speech claims on commercial
private property,"° and protects dissenters from land use decisions
that represent "mainstream majority moral attitudes." 1 Although
personhood theory has encountered some cogent critiques in recent years, the pushback has focused more on the extent to which
people constitute themselves through their property than on the
normative valence of the theory. 2 Personhood, as Radin and a
generation of scholars have assumed, protects "Native American
group claims to their ancestral territory.'" 3 It seems perverse to
suggest that the idea has anything to do with property claims of the
people who massacred them.
For understandable reasons, then, scholars have overlooked how
people become "bound up" in their property-in what personhood

" Radin, supra note 19, at 991-92, 997-1001.
4' Id. at 992-96.
" Id. at 1004.
'0Id. at 1008-09.
Id. at 1012-13.
52
See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 21, at 798-800; Stephanie M. Stern, Residential
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of the Home, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 109597 (2009) [hereinafter Stern, Residential]; Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home:
Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 905, 926-29
(2010). While Stern questions the emotional investment people make in their homes,
Davidson notes that personhood theories are complicated by pervasive statussignaling in property culture that has "as much potential to warp identity as to embody
or foster it." Davidson, supra note 21, at 798.
5
'Radin, supra note 19, at 1006.
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theory would deem the best and most morally defensible ways"when they have committed hurtful and harmful acts for it. In the
generation following the publication of Radin's article and the
emergence of personhood theory, two major related areas of property scholarship have taken shape. First, there has been a revived
interest in what scholars have called the "American property tradition." Complicating the classical utilitarian "preference-satisfying
conception of property,"55 scholars such as Professors Carol Rose
and Gregory Alexander have noted a competing emphasis in
American property law on civic virtue and the public good. Rooted
in Aristotle and famously articulated by Thomas Jefferson, the
American property tradition links the autonomy of ownership to
the desire and ability to participate as an independent, virtuous
citizen in a republic.56 Property and American nationhood are intuitively linked to property and personhood. In his classic 1782 collection, Letters from an American Farmer, J. Hector St. John de
Crevecoeur described the distinctly American effect of ownership
of land: "It feeds, it clothes us, from it we draw even a great exuberancy ....[N]o wonder that so many Europeans... cross the
Atlantic to realize that happiness.0 7 "[T]he bright idea of property," in Crevecoeur's timeless phrasing, forms the heart of the
American republic, but also of a more personal American dream."
In a related development, some of the same scholars have created theories of "progressive property" that seek to push the doctrine towards "establish[ing] the framework for a kind of social life

"4 To use Radin's examples, such owners would not engage in unhealthy "object fetishism" or "fetishism of commodities." Id. at 969-70.
5
Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity & Propriety: Competing Visions of Property
in American Legal Thought 1776-1970, at 1 (1997); see Carol M. Rose, "Takings" and
the Practices of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as "Propriety," in Property
and Persuasion 49, 51 (1994).
6
Alexander, supra note 55, at 29-31; Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why
the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.Cal. L. Rev. 561, 588-93 (1984); Rose, supra
note 55, at 58-62.
17Beyond the emotional effect of property, Crevecoeur also discussed
the political
rights that ownership brings. J.Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Letters from an
American Farmer 27 (Fox, Duffield & Co. 1904) (1782).
" See Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1009, 1010 (2009) ("The family home is the core
of the American Dream, and that means that property is central to the way we
Americans define ourselves as a people.").
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appropriate to a free and democratic society" 59 -a law of property
that promotes values that include "life and human flourishing, the
protection of physical security, the ability to acquire knowledge
and make choices, and the freedom to live one's life on one's own
terms."' In what they see as an optimistic and personhoodaffirming rejoinder to classical utilitarian and contemporary Law
and Economics approaches, progressive scholars focus on property's "inherently relational" nature.6 "[O]wners," Gregory Alexander recently wrote, "necessarily owe obligations to others....
That which is socially cognizable as property is only that form of
access to resources that is consistent with human flourishing and
community itself."62 Progressive notions of property share much of
the same orientation as personhood theory in their valorization of
individual autonomy and critique of commodified market relations.63 But neither theory fully accounts for the multiple valences
of personhood and how property law manages personhood claims
that conflate atrocious conduct with what constitutes an ownership
right and with what makes ownership sweet. The next Section considers why violence and pain might foster personhood, drawing on
social psychology and cultural and legal theory.
B. Understandingthe Atrocity Value in Property
1. InitialIntuitions
In Property and Personhood, Margaret Jane Radin began her
argument with an intuitive case that "there is such a thing as property for personhood because people become bound up with
'things,"' the loss of which "cannot be relieved by the object's replacement."' The primary example she gives involves a wedding
ring: "[I]f a wedding ring is stolen from a jeweler, insurance pro-

SAlexander et al., supra note 31, at 744.
Id. at 743.
6,Alexander, supra note 24, at 747 & n.2; see also Purdy, supra note 12, at 2, 4-5,
135; Joseph William Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property 130-39 (2000);
Singer, supra note 35, at 3; Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property as Entrance, 91 Va. L.
Rev.
62 1889, 1907, 1911, 1917-18 (2005); Singer, supra note 58, at 1045-46.
Alexander, supra note 24, at 747-49.
63 See, e.g., Eduardo Mois6s Pefialver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws: How
Squatters, Pirates, and Protesters Improve the Law of Ownership 26-27 (2010).
Radin, supra note 19, at 961, 959.
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ceeds can reimburse the jeweler, but if a wedding ring is stolen
from a loving wearer, the price of a replacement will not restore
the status quo-perhaps no amount of money can do so. ' A ring
in a Tiffany display window is a fungible commodity, but on a
bride's finger it is something much more. 6
One can begin to understand the personhood that inheres in
atrocity with another example involving a jewel based on the ca67 In
nonical eighteenth-century English case, Armory v. Delamirie.
Armory, a chimney sweep's boy found a jewel and showed it to a
goldsmith's apprentice who then took it and refused to give it back.
While neither party had a particularly strong claim on the ring, the
court resolved the case in favor of the chimney sweep's boy, who
could sue to get the jewel back because he had a superior property
claim to "all but the rightful owner."' The court made no comment
on the personal stakes of the case. Personhood had nothing to do
with the decision, and its resolution in favor of the first possessor
has applied equally in cases involving two innocent finders or two
converters.69 As a result, Armory provides a useful starting point to
consider the notion that personhood can have competing valences:
how each side of the conflict derives personhood from the jewel.
What is the value of the jewel to the chimney sweep's boy? It is a
fungible commodity-he brought it to the goldsmith to get an appraisal-but also much more. Chimney sweepers lived brief, tragic
lives "lock[e]d up in coffins of black," heads shorn, gasping for
breath." Many chimney sweeps' boys never lived to adulthood. A
6' Id. at 959.
66Radin might

be overestimating the sentimental value of a wedding ring in a society where half of all marriages end in a divorce. Over the course of a marriage, as
fashions change and people get wealthier, many trade their rings in for something
nicer. See Joan Y. Dickinson, The Book of Diamonds 169 (Dover ed. 2001). In Great
Expectations by Charles Dickens, Wemmick famously viewed rings as "portable
property." Charles Dickens, Great Expectations 158 (Bizarro Press 2009) (1861).
67 1 Strange 505 (K.B. 1722). The case is reprinted in at least two widely taught casebooks. See Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 96 (6th ed. 2006); Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 220-21 (2007).
Armory, 1 Strange at 505.
69
See, e.g., Clark v. Maloney, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 68, 69 (1840); Anderson v. Gouldberg,
53 N.W. 636, 637 (Minn. 1892). Both cases are reprinted in Merrill & Smith, supra
note 67, at 222-25.
70William Blake, The Chimney Sweeper, in Songs of Innocence, in The Complete
Poetry & Prose of William Blake 10 (David V. Erdman ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1981)
(1789) ("When my mother died I was very young, / And my father sold me while yet
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valuable jewel could be the start of a new life. It could represent
the difference between life and death.
What does the jewel mean to the person who steals it from the
chimney sweep? It is certainly a fungible commodity for him, too;
after all, the goldsmith's apprentice was appraising the piece and
attaching a monetary figure to it. The jewel could also be a path
out of a grueling apprenticeship, although a goldsmith's apprentice
presumably had far better prospects than a chimney sweep's boy.
Or, taking the jewel could be an expression of professionalism, the
proper action of a trained appraiser who suspects that the chimney
sweep stole it or believes the true owner may be more likely to be
reunited with the piece if it were kept by a goldsmith's shop. Finally, taking the jewel could be status-affirming: inflicting harm on
the chimney sweep's boy-belittling him, ignoring his plightmight elevate the relative importance of the goldsmith's apprentice.71 Not being swayed by sympathy-insisting that his actions
were right and justified-could be closely linked to the apprentice's
identity. While Radin intuits that "one should not invest oneself in
the wrong way or to too great an extent in external objects,"" the
goldsmith's apprentice is not engaged in what Radin has deemed
unacceptable manifestations of personhood. His interest in the
jewel is not "object fetishism,"73 for example, nor is he the "caricature capitalist" who seeks "control over a vast quantity of things
and other people."7 The apprentice's relationship to the jewel may
be entirely proper and personal, to the same extent that it is cruel
and selfish.
2. The Social Psychology of Atrocity and Personhood
Despite the arguably abhorrent nature of the act of the goldsmith's apprentice-stealing from and all but dooming a poor, defenseless boy-it is unlikely to prompt much soul-searching, even if
the apprentice has a normal conscience. Social psychology research
of the last half-century has revealed the great lengths to which
my tongue, / Could scarcely cry weep weep weep weep, / So your chimneys I sweep &
in soot I sleep."). I thank Ann Mikkelsen for suggesting this source.
7,Cf. Davidson, supra note 21, at 798-99.
n Radin, supra note 19, at 961.
Id. at 969-70.
Id. at 970.
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most people will go to rationalize their harmful acts.75 They might
think of the victim as a wrongdoer: the chimney sweep was a thief.76
They might think of the victim as an outsider: a lowly chimney
sweep's boy is not entitled to be treated as an equal." They might
minimize the harm done by their acts: the jewel was not worth that
much anyway. 8 And they might view their acts as an affirmation of
who they are and how dedicated they may be to someone or something: this is what a good goldsmith's apprentice must do to fulfill
his duty to act on suspicious appraisals, and being a good goldsmith's apprentice is an honorable position in life. 9 In one way or
another, they double down and commit all the more to their harmful conduct.'
The real property context is fraught with occasion for selfjustifying behavior. People take property that others claim as their
" See generally Elliot Aronson, The Social Animal 175-246 (7th ed. 1995) [hereinafter Aronson, The Social Animal]. Discussions of self-justification in social psychology
are rooted in theories of "cognitive dissonance." See, e.g., Leon Festinger, A Theory
of Cognitive Dissonance 3 (1957). Festinger's work has inspired a half-century of
theoretical and experimental work probing when and why people engage in selfjustifying behavior, what kinds of behavior they exhibit, and whether such behavior
can be modified, reduced, or eliminated. See, e.g., Elliot Aronson, The Return of the
Repressed: Dissonance Theory Makes a Comeback, 3 Psychol. Inquiry 303, 303
(1992); Joel Cooper & Russell H. Fazio, A New Look at Dissonance Theory, 17 Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol. 229, 229-32 (1984); Rob W. Holland et al., Dissonance on the Road: Self-Esteem as a Moderator of Internal and External SelfJustification Strategies, 28 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1713, 1713-15 (2002); Jeff
Stone et al., When Exemplification Fails: Hypocrisy and the Motive for Self-Integrity,
72 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 54, 55, 63-64 (1997). For psychoanalytical explanations of similar conduct under the rubric of reaction formation, sublimation, and projection, see generally Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (rev. ed.
1979); George E. Vaillant, Ego Mechanisms of Defense: A Guide for Clinicians and
Researchers (1992). I rely primarily on the social psychological literature, as opposed
to psychoanalysis, because the concepts of self-justification and cognitive dissonance
derive more naturally from situations analogous to the property cases I discuss
throughout
this Article.
76
See, e.g., Aronson, The Social Animal, supra note 75, at 217-23.
77Id. On the practice of "othering" the victims of expropriation, see Carol M. Rose,
Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 Utah L.
Rev. 1, 24-25, 28.
78See, e.g., Linda Simon et al., Trivialization: The Forgotten Mode of Dissonance
Reduction, 68 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 247, 247-48, 257-58 (1995).
79See, e.g., Claude M. Steele & Thomas J. Liu, Dissonance Processes as SelfAffirmation, 45 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 16-18 (1981).
80Cf. Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 Acad.
Mgmt. Rev. 577, 578-80 (1981).
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own. Incompatible uses are common. Regardless of whether we
think of such situations in terms of reciprocity of fault, in a world
beset with transaction costs they produce winners and losers.8 ' As
neighborhoods evolve over time, there is always friction between
old and new users and old and new uses.' Neighbors, for good reasons and bad, get on each other's nerves. There is a reason,
grounded in experience, that the Tenth Commandment includes
the specific prohibition, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
house.""
In many property conflicts (as in many other contexts), people
justify their behavior by blaming or "othering" the victim and
"trivializing" the harms. But they also justify themselves through
their property. ' They love their land and are good owners, so
whatever harm they do in the course of acquiring or owning it must
be worth the pain that they caused. Just as severe initiation rituals
for a club produce members who overestimate the club's desirability," the trials of property ownership can create more committed
owners. As owners justify hurting others, the way they conceive of
the land and its attendant ownership rights attains a crucial function in enabling people to live with themselves. They conflate their
conduct with their ownership rights, which in turn reinforces who
they are as people.

"' See generally Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 Geo. L.J. 863, 865-66 (2010).
Property casebooks are packed with such cases. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra
note 67, at 50-55 (building encroachment cases).
" Exodus 20:17. This prohibition precedes those against coveting wives, servants,
and livestock, all of which the verse seems to regard as personal property. Deuteronomy 5:21, by contrast, begins with the prohibition against coveting wives and then
adds, "neither shalt thou covet thy neighbour's house, his field, or his manservant, or
his maidservant, his ox, or his ass, or any [thing] that [is] thy neighbour's." Today the
prohibition seems to exist more as aspiration than law. See, e.g., Howard v. Kunto,
477 P.2d 210, 212 (Wash. 1970) (describing a plaintiff who aggressively sought his
neighbors' vacation home, which had a dock).
' Cf. Holland et al., supra note 75, at 1714 ("[A]n example of [an internal selfjustification strategy] for car drivers who have been confronted with the negative outcomes of their travel mode choice.. . could include attitude change ('My car is everything for me').").
' See, e.g., Elliot Aronson & Judson Mills, The Effect of Severity of Initiation on
Liking for a Group, 59 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 177, 181 (1959); Harold Gerard &
Grover Mathewson, The Effects of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group: A
Replication, 2 J.Experimental Soc. Psychol. 278, 286 (1966).
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3. Atrocity, Personhood,and the CulturalDynamics of Violence
The broader cultural dynamics of violence further suggest how
personhood can spring from harmful conduct. Violence often has
the aim and effect of drawing boundaries for perpetrator and victim alike. It is no coincidence that in The Body in Pain, Professor
Elaine Scarry grounds her classic discussion of the relationship between torturer and victim in metaphors of property and territoriality. Torture is not just a "world-destroying" attack on the victim,
Scarry writes.' At the same time, it can be "world expanding" for
the torturer, constitutive of identity.Y The torturer's world is not
simply defined by the absence or denial of pain. The infliction of
pain is accompanied by a belief in a cause or goal beyond the narrowest objectives of torture. "The torturer's questions," according
to Scarry, "announce in their feigned urgency the critical importance of [his] world, a world whose asserted magnitude is confirmed by the cruelty it is able to motivate and justify."'
I suggest that this assertion of a particular set of commitments to
justify torture continues outside the torture chamber. While Scarry
describes the mechanisms by which a torturer "objectifies pain,
then denies the pain,"'89 I would argue it is not true that "to allow
the reality of the other's suffering to enter [the torturer's] own consciousness would immediately compel him to stop the torture. '
Rather, the torturer hears "prolonged, agonized human screams"
with the same ears as anyone else.' What allows him to keep torturing-and to enjoy dinner with his family afterwards-is a commitment to his world. He must restate and justify it constantly.9
The brutal, zero-sum expansion that defines the dynamics of torture compels justification; it is world-destroying, but also necessarily world-creating, and directly linked to personhood.

' Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World 29
(1985).
g7Id.
mId. at 36.
9Id. at 57.
90Id.
" Id. at 51.
92Torturers may have a "covert disdain for confession," as Scarry asserts. Id. at 29.
That disdain may extend not only to confessions by torture victims, but also to admissions of wrongdoing by torturers.
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4. Personhood, Violence, and the Law
The idea that personhood can derive from violence is hardly
confined to the context of torture. It plays out in more mundane
circumstances in communities every day. And every day it moves
from neighborhoods into the courtroom. When the law considers
conflicts over property, many of these cases involve a considerable
measure of nastiness, anger, and pain. And this conduct, impinging
on the aspirations and expectations of others, can be constitutive of
people's sense of themselves and their land. Navigating this landscape poses a challenge for property law. When Professor Robert
Cover theorized the relationship between law and violence in his
classic essay Violence and the Word, he used criminal sentencing
and the death penalty to describe how "the relationship between
legal interpretation and the infliction of pain remains operative
even in the most routine of legal acts."93 But in a footnote, he wrote
that he was "prepared to argue that all law which concerns property, its use and its protection, has a similarly violent base."'9 Perhaps Cover's intriguing footnote reflects a view of property that
accounts for the potential for violence to erupt in conflicts over
land. Unlike criminal law, however, property law does not prevent
or monopolize violence through the direct administration of pain
by the state. Property law might on occasion acknowledge the possibility of violence.95 It often acts to curb nasty behavior.96 But it
usually does so without directly confronting or outlawing the behavior at issue. This indirection may be necessary in part because
such a wide range of behaviors implicate personhood and because
it can be difficult to distinguish personhood's most amiable manifestations from its least. When property law declines to decide
property conflicts as competing personhood claims, even the least
sociable owners retain their stake in the regime, and cooperation
rather than violence remains the norm.
It may be hard to square the multiple valences of personhood,
positive and negative, with the longstanding cultural values that
have encouraged Americans to invest themselves in their property.

9 Cover, supra note 38, at 1607.
Id. at 1607 n.16.
9' See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160-61 (Wis. 1997).
See infra Part III.
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Personhood in property is closely connected to American identity
and the "American dream." But putting personhood into historical
context reveals that even at the origin of the American dream, personhood cut in different directions. The next Part examines the
role of atrocity in enabling Americans to embrace the land, a constitutive violence that continues to manifest itself in property cases
today.
II. BLOOD AT THE ROOT: ATROCITY AND THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN PROPERTY TRADITION

While the preceding theoretical discussion helps make sense of
why atrocity might foster personhood, this Part considers atrocity
from a more immanent, historical perspective. After first outlining
the links between property, personhood, and the American dream,
I turn to the historical experience of the Puritan-Indian encounter
in seventeenth-century New England to explore how violence
played one role among many in the creation of a strong cultural
value that supports personal identification with property.
A. Property, Personhood,and the American Dream
"Property," Professor Joseph William Singer writes, "is central
to the American story," a social institution "at the core of the
American dream."' For centuries it has defined how Americans
have thought of themselves and their communities. It has been a
constant source of inspiration, aspiration, and striving. Americans
have molded the rhetoric and substance of their politics around
property, and it has been the medium through which Americans
have conceived of liberty and equality and the relationship between individuals and government in a republic.98 Property is a
dream of wealth and prosperity, and one of the key achievements
of the American Revolution was the triumph of a broadly accessible market-driven vision of land over static notions of perpetual

98Singer,

supra note 58, at 1020.
Alexander, supra note 55, at 17 ("Property has been a powerful cultural symbol
throughout American history."); Singer, supra note 58, at 1009, 1010, 1020
("[P]roperty is central to the way we Americans define ourselves as a people.").
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family ownership.' Property is also a dream of democracy and
community, as the combination of autonomy and obligation in
ownership molds a virtuous citizenry." ° And property represents an
American dream of self-realization and individual fulfillment.
When Thomas Jefferson spoke of "[t]hose who labour in the
earth" as "the chosen people of God," whose "manners and spirit"
contribute to the "permanence of government" and "preserve a
republic in vigour," he attributed their virtues to the moral effect,
the "happiness," that arises from committed ownership."0 ' The
American dream may envision using property for material ends,
but it also loves and celebrates the land. The personhood that people invest in their property has long contributed to nationhood.
The centrality of land in American life is instilled as a cultural
value in elementary school. "In their first history lessons," Singer
writes, "children are taught about brave western settlers staking
claims in the wilderness, building the family home, planting the
crops, and reaping the rewards of hard labor." It is a creation story
that seems to have no place, in Singer's wry phrasing, for "the little
problems of conquest of Indian nations, the enslavement of Africans, and the unequal status of women.""
This Part suggests that the tragic histories of atrocity and inequality in the United States are not incompatible with the ways in
which Americans have associated property with their happiness
and fulfillment and have invested so much of themselves in it.
While the role of slavery in shaping American attitudes towards
property has been the subject of a steadily expanding body of
scholarship," I focus on how violent encounters with Native
"9Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 269-70 (1991);
Singer, supra note 58, at 1020 ("John Locke is the ultimate Founding Father."). Gregory Alexander has compellingly shown, however, how that older, proprietarian vision
of property persisted long after the Revolution. See generally Alexander, supra note

55.
" Alexander, supra note 55, at 30-33; Rose, supra note 55, at 51.
.0,
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 197 (David Waldstreicher ed.,
Bedford/St. Martin's 2002) (1787).
' Singer, supra note 58, at 1020.
,03See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 55, at 211-40; Edmund S. Morgan, American
Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia 297 (1975); Claire
Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and its Limits in American
History, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 419-21 (2006); Purdy, supra note 45, at 1060-68.
Alexander includes a fascinating discussion of pro-slavery theorist Thomas Cobb's
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Americans helped shape the ways in which American colonists
identified with the land. My interest is less in the conquest of nations than in the killing of Native American men, women, and children.'" I explore these questions through the prism of King Philip's

concerns that the commodification of slaves would turn Southerners into people who
were "less citizens than.., autonomous, preference-maximizing agents." Alexander,
supra note 55, at 239. I would argue that the commodification of slaves, the increase
in the number of transactions and the cruelty of separating families, strengthened
feelings of mastery and with it a sense of ownership in its fullest, proprietarian sense.
From the Revolution onward, a steady abolitionist drumbeat put evidence of slavery's
horrors squarely before slave-owners. Many pro-slavery writers initially responded by
acknowledging the cruelty of the institution, but over time they began to devise arguments for its wisdom and superiority to free labor. See Michael O'Brien, 2 Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810-1860, at 938-92
(2004); Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Invisible Line: Three American Families and the Secret Journey from Black to White 67 (2011). At the same time, slave-owners continued to acknowledge the cruelty of slavery in private, complaining about their overseers or more directly expressing reservations about the institution itself. Sharfstein,
supra, at 62; see also William E. Wiethoff, Crafting the Overseer's Image, at xiii
(2006). Even denials of slavery's cruelty are connected to personal experience of it. In
State v. Mann, 2 Dev. 263, 267-68 (N.C. 1829), Judge Ruffin asserted that
the private interest of the owner, the benevolences towards each other, seated
in the hearts of those who have been born and bred together, the frowns and
deep execrations of the community upon the barbarian, who is guilty of excessive and brutal cruelty to his unprotected slave, all combined, have produced a
mildness of treatment, and attention to the comforts of the unfortunate class of
slaves, greatly mitigating the rigors of servitude, and ameliorating the condition
of the slaves.
Five years earlier, Ruffin, who himself was in the business of selling slaves to Alabama, had received a complaint about the "evil and barbarous treatment" of his
slaves by his overseer. Letter from Archibald De Bow Murphey to Thomas Ruffin
(June 3, 1824) (on file with the Thomas Ruffin Papers (#641), Southern Historical
Collection, Manuscripts Department, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill). Acknowledging the cruelty arguably made people see themselves as better masters, the very type who should be entrusted to own other people.
" Stuart Banner's fascinating account of the centuries-long process of dispossessing
the Native Americans of their land emphasizes the relative power balance between
early English settlers and Native Americans, and the long history of bargained-for
land transactions before a more contract-oriented approach gave way to conquest in
the nineteenth century. Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and
Power on the Frontier (2005). Joseph Singer's reckoning that "we non-Indians cannot
trace our titles to a just origin" acknowledges that "[clonquest is part and parcel of
the American story," Singer, supra note 35, at 3, 7, but conquest--dispossession
through collective action-is more abstractly related to the creation of the American
property tradition than violence and atrocity. For hundreds of years, killing Indians
was a fact of American life. From the beginning, it had an enormous constitutive role
in how settlers understood and related to their land. On a cultural level, genocide sets
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War, a conflict of elemental cruelty between Puritan colonists and
Algonquin tribes in 1675-76 that destroyed half of the English
towns in New England and ended only after a rampage of genocidal retribution." Regarded by historians such as Professor Rich0'1 6
ard Slotkin as "an archetype of all the wars which followed,'
King Philip's War inspired a tremendous outpouring of selfexamination among the Puritans about their "errand into the wilderness."'" A significant historical moment, it suggests the complexity of personhood in property and how it was not solely the
product of the noblest narratives of the American experience.
B. The Howling Wilderness: Propertyas Loss in Early America
It is easy to think that property has always been synonymous
with the American dream."° Although property regimes tend to be
shrouded in historical narratives of a mythical past,"° American
ideas of property have a specific history that happens to be coincident with the nation's beginnings. With Thomas Jefferson championing the Republic of Yeoman Farmers and with Hector St. Jean
de Crevecoeur writing at the dawn of the Republic of how his
farm-how the "bright idea of property"-made him an American," it can seem that property's place in the American dream is as
old as the idea of America itself.

boundaries, Lepore, supra note 44, at xiii, and in the American experience it was
closely tied to the meaning of property ownership.
" Jill Lepore describes it as "the most fatal war in all of American history but also
one of the most merciless." Lepore, supra note 44, at xiii.
" Slotkin, supra note 44; see also James D. Drake, Restraining Atrocity: The Conduct of King Philip's War, 70 New Eng. Q. 33, 33 (1997) (describing King Philip's War
as "the war to end all wars in New England's battle for supremacy"). While Jill
Lepore disputes its "foundational" or "archetypal" status, she nonetheless concedes
that "there remains something about King Philip's War that hints of allegory. In a
sense, King Philip's War never ended. In other times, in other places, its painful
wounds would be reopened, its vicious words spoken again." Lepore, supra note 44, at
xiii.7
, Slotkin, supra note 44, at 38.
' Gregory Alexander notes that property represents multiple traditions, but the
centrality of property, even as a concept that contains multitudes, is a given. Alexander, supra note 55, at 17.
10 Rose, supra note 37, at
38.
110Crevecoeur, supra note 57, at 27.
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But American traditions of property were made, not born. The
first generations of settlers would not have recognized the celebration of American property that Jefferson and Crevecoeur embraced. When the Mayflower anchored off the coast of Cape Cod
in early November 1620, America did not seem like "home" for the
English on board. "[T]hey had no friends to welcome them nor
inns to entertain or refresh their weatherbeaten bodies," wrote
William Bradford of his fellow Pilgrims, "no houses or much less
town to repair to, to seek for succour...... Summer was long past,

and the land was gray, a "hideous and desolate wilderness, f[u]ll of
wild beasts and wild men."12 After six weeks of scouting, just as the

English had decided to settle a place they would name Plymouth,
Bradford's wife Dorothy fell off the Mayflower and drowned, a
death that has been widely regarded as a suicide."' America did not
resemble a promised land. It was not a place where one would find
oneself. It was a place where people disappeared.
In an unforgiving land, where winters meant starvation-many
feared they would resort to cannibalism-and summers meant
cholera and dysentery,"' it was hardly a given that property would
assume central importance in the culture of a new nation. For generations, American property was not a source of strength. "The
land was ours before we were the land's," Robert Frost proclaimed
in "The Gift Outright," "Possessing what we still were unpossessed
by, / Possessed by what we now no more possessed.""' 5 The stark
landscape was a representation of loss, of European lives and
communities that the settlers would never know again. And it was
a source of declension: the land, many feared, was turning Englishmen and women into savages.
The settlers of Massachusetts shared a seventeenth-century English sense that individual identity can and should be bound up in
"'

William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647, at 69-70 (Random House,

Inc. 1981) (1856).

"'Id. at 70.
"' Francis Murphy, Introduction to Bradford, supra note 111, at xiii.
",
Bradford, supra note 111, at 85-87 (describing "the starving time"); cf. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Apathy and Death in Early Jamestown, 66 J. Am. Hist. 24, 24
(1979); Rachel B. Herrmann, The "Tragicall Historie": Cannibalism and Abundance
in Colonial Jamestown, 68 Wm.& Mary Q. 47, 48-49 (2011).
"' Robert Frost, The Gift Outright, in The Poetry of Robert Frost 348 (Edward
Connery Lathem ed., 2002). Slotkin quotes the poem, supra note 44, at 17.
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one's property,"6 and owning land was supposed to be one of the
essential things that made an Englishman different from an Indian."7 But the land and its original inhabitants almost immediately
marked the colonists, drawing them away from the lives they had
known. The first generation of settlers lived in woven huts that resembled and were commonly referred to as "wigwams, '... and over
time, as the settlers worked their way deeper into the wilderness,
they began to shed their English identity in other ways, abandoning
their religious traditions, changing their dress and diet, and relaxing their grip on their native language. 19 "Instead of being the stage
for the perfection of piety," wrote Professor Jill Lepore, "the
120
woods of New England might in truth be a forest of depravity.'

C. Loving the Land After Killingfor It: King Philip's War
The first generations of New Englanders lived in fear that they
would fail the trials that God was putting them through in the wilderness, that the land would strip them of everything that had
made them a chosen people.' 2' The settlers began to embrace the

land in part because of routine property transactions. The widespread seventeenth-century practice of buying land from Native
Americans enabled the English to think of them as allies as opposed to adversaries, people who shared core English values and
whose villages often resembled life in England before the enclo-

...
See Alexander, supra note 55, at 8 ("[T]he proprietarian conception was a wellestablished tradition in European legal-political thought, and eighteenth-century
American legal intellectuals were the heirs of that tradition.... The American colonies themselves began as property-based arrangements that were overtly proprie-

tarian in character.").
,,7 Lepore, supra note 44, at 76. For a discussion of Native American attitudes towards property in early New England, see William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England 62-67 (1983).
"' Lepore, supra note 44, at 77.
"9 Id. at 6; Slotkin, supra note 44, at 18, 86 (quoting a 1676 sermon by Increase
Mather decrying how "they that profess themselves Christians have forsaken
Churches, and Ordinances, and all for land and elbow-room"); cf. Charles Woodmason, The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve of the Revolution 7, 13, 15, 18, 25, 31, 52
(Richard J. Hooker ed., 1953).
120 Lepore, supra note 44,
at 6-7.
1..On the Puritan fixation on declension, see generally Sacvan Bercovitch, The
American Jeremiad (1978).
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sure of common lands.1" The existence of an active property market among the English further normalized life on the frontier.'" In
the relative peace of the mid-seventeenth century, colonists could
coexist with Native Americans while creating an English-style
property regime."' Southern New England's landscape began to resemble Europe, cleared and bounded."n But as Puritan settlements
expanded, the hunting grounds, agricultural practices, and traditional lifestyles of the remaining tribes came under material and
cultural pressures that grew increasingly desperate.'26
If tensions were rising between settlers and tribes in the 1670s,
neither side was prepared for the carnage of King Philip's War. It
began in June 1675 as a series of attacks on English towns by the
Wampanoags, a tribe that lived on Narragansett Bay in what is
now Bristol, Rhode Island.'27 Their leader was a man whom the
English called Philip.'2 Over the next year, Algonquin tribes from
Rhode Island to Maine joined the struggle. Together, they almost
drove the colonists into the sea, destroying twenty-five English
"2 See Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the
Frontier 23-28, 37, 39 (2005); John Frederick Martin, Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in the Seventeenth Century
18 (1991). As Martin notes, routine land purchases coexisted with conquest and extermination. Martin, supra; see also Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson
v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1065, 1071, 1077 (2000). Although Puritans initially could not claim title to Indian
land under the terms of their colonial charters, the earliest incidents of genocidal violence such as the Pequot War of 1637 directly led to the first claims that the English
could take Indian territory. Drake, supra note 106, at 36. Devastating smallpox outbreaks also fostered closer ties between Indians and the English, decimating native
settlements and convincing many Indians to embrace Christianity on their deathbeds
and arrange for their orphaned children to be raised by the English. Lepore, supra
note 44, at 28.
" For a discussion of land sales and speculation in colonial New England generally,
see generally Martin, supra note 122.
124 Drake, supra note 106, at 51. Christian Indians lived
in "praying towns" in proximity to English settlements. Lepore, supra note 44, at 25.
''Lepore, supra note 44, at 77 ("By the 1670s, at the start of King Philip's War, the
English could boast that 'by their great industry,' they had 'of a howling Wilderness
improved those Lands into Cornfields, Orchards, enclosed Pastures, and Towns inhabited."').
'11Id. at 96, 114-21; Cronon, supra note 117.
,27The precipitating event was the hanging of three Wampanoag men at Plymouth
for the murder of a Native American convert to Christianity who had told English authorities that the tribe was preparing for war. Lepore, supra note 44, at 23.
8 His original name was Metacom. Id. at xvi.
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towns-more than half of the settlements in New Englandincluding Springfield and Providence. 129 The tribes brutalized English victims, who were frequently stripped naked and scalped, their
fingers hacked off and worn as trophies." Among the Puritans, it
was widely believed that the war was God's punishment for relaxing their faith and shedding their English identity, punishment for
what the land had done to them."'
To fight and win the war, colonial forces engaged in cruelty on a
massive scale. They killed casually, simply turning their guns on
even loyal Indians. 2 They filled boat after boat with Indian slaves
in chains, destined for the Caribbean.'33 The Puritans engaged in
deliberate and calculated acts of murder, individual and collective." Their armies massacred entire settlements,'35 most notably
on December 19, 1675, when a colonial military expedition discovered a large village of women and children in the Narragansett
Great Swamp in southern Rhode Island. Soldiers began burning
wigwams and shooting everyone who fled until the area was a
wasteland of smoldering ash and thousands of charred corpses; neither food nor shelter was salvageable, both of which the colonists
desperately needed. 36 Puritans frequently mutilated the bodies of
29

Id. at xi-xii. Lepore notes that Native American forces purposely targeted Puri-

tan property, knowing its cultural significance. Id. at 95.
.30
Id. at 79.
"' Richard Slotkin & James K. Folsom, Increase Mather: Puritan Mythologist, in So
Dreadful a Judgment: Puritan Responses to King Philip's War, 1676-1677, at 57, 62
(Slotkin & Folsom eds., 1978).
112 See, e.g., John Canup, Out of the Wilderness: The
Emergence of an American
Identity in Colonial New England 186 (1990); Daniel Gookin, An Historical Account
of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians of New England, In the Years
1675, 1676, 1677 (1677), in 2 Archaeologia Americana: Transactions & Collections of
the American Antiquarian Society 423, 475 (1836).
33See James D. Drake, King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676, at
136-39 (1999).
,34After determining that an elderly prisoner was too old to sell into slavery, for example, his Puritan captors debated having him "devoured by doges" before deciding
to "Cut Ofe his head." John Easton, A Relacion of the Indyan Warre (1675), in Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699, at 7, 16 (Charles H. Lincoln ed., 1913); see also
Slotkin, supra note 44, at 82 (describing attempted lynchings in Boston); Drake, supra
note 106, at 46 n.33 (describing an Indian woman whose captor ordered her torn apart
by dogs).
"3 See Lepore, supra note 44, at 88.
Id. at 88-89. Benjamin Tompson, a poet at the time, described the massacre:
"Here might be heard an hideous Indian cry, / Of wounded ones who in the wigwams
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their victims and marked the landscape with them. Roads were
lined with heads on pikes. When colonial forces finally caught and
killed King Philip near his traditional home in August 1676, they
cut off his head and quartered him, leaving his body "to lie unbur'
ied and rot above ground."137
The Puritans justified their excesses in myriad ways, as punishment for treason or as self-defense proportional to what had been
inflicted upon them. They analogized to biblical accounts of the
killing of the Amalekites and spoke of the massacres as God's plan
to subject the Indians to "utter destruction and extirpation from off
the face of the earth, peradventure to make room for others of his
people to come in his stead."' ' In March 1676, with his home in
Providence burning behind him, Roger Williams told a group of
Narragansett Indians in a face-to-face meeting that "God had
prospered us so that wee had ... destroyed Multitudes of them in
and Cold etc.: and that God would
Fighting and Flying, In Hungr
1 39
)
them.
Consume
to
us
help
At the same time, the bloodshed provoked widespread unease
among the colonists."4 The atrocities were gratuitous, often inflicted on noncombatants and occurring mostly after victory was
assured."' Puritan killers knew many of their Indian victims; they
had been neighbors.'42 The zeal to "take, kill, burn, sink, destroy...
fry. / Had we been cannibals here might we feast / On brave Westphalia gammons
ready dressed. / The tawny hue is Ethiopic made / Of such on whom Vulcan his
clutches laid." Id.
117Drake, supra note 106, at
40.
' William Hubbard, A Narrative of the Indian Wars in New England 234 (Brattleborough, William Fessenden 1814).
39
Lepore, supra note 44, at 120 (quoting Roger Williams).
" See Slotkin, supra note 44, at 55.
141When the outcome was in doubt, the colonists tended to refrain from excessive
violence out of fear that other Indian tribes would join the rebellion. Drake, supra
note 106, at 42; see also Slotkin, supra note 44, at 173 (describing Benjamin Church's
horror upon finding Philip's lieutenant Annawon's head on a pike after the warrior
had surrendered to him). The English well knew the distinction between "hot
blooded" and "cold blooded" killing. See Barbara Donagan, Atrocity, War Crime,
and Treason in the English Civil War, 99 Am. Hist. Rev. 1137, 1144 (1994).
142On November 15, 1675, for example, after "skulking rogues of the
enemy"
burned a barn full of hay and corn, colonists from Chelmsford, Massachusetts, held a
meeting: "[It was moved among them and concluded," according to the Puritan superintendent of Indians in Massachusetts:
that they would go to the wigwams of the Wamesit Indians, their neighbours,
and kill them all; in pursuance whereof they came to the wigwams, and called to
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and not to pity or spare any of them"'4 3 was almost too much for
the Boston minister Increase Mather. In a March 1676 diary entry,
he described telling a Plymouth man that "he should not so condemn all the Indians as he did wishing them hanged &c that then
innocent blood would cry." The response unnerved him: "He replied that he would say as the Jews did, their blood be upon me &
my Children, which was a dreadful expression & made me fear
what would come upon his Children."'"
While historians have suggested that the extremes of Puritan
violence compromised their English identity-they were "fighting
like savages" or brutalizing the natives as the Spanish had done' 45the brutality tracked what soldiers had done in the English Civil
War and the conquest of Ireland. 46 Committing atrocities, only to
condemn them in hindsight as something that English people did
not do, was arguably a hallmark of Englishness." Far from being a
moment of cultural defeat in military victory, the aftermath of King
Philip's War became an occasion when Puritan identity grew
stronger, when a war that was seen as God's retribution for declension prompted calls to recommit to original principles, and when
new modes of storytelling such as the "sermon-narrative" emerged
as powerful tools for stating and restating what it meant to be English in America.'48 Imagining that they had committed atrocities as
Indians would have, the Puritans felt compelled to redouble their
commitment to maintaining the integrity of their community, to

the poor Indians to come out of doors, which most of them readily did, both
men, women, and children, not in the least suspecting the English would hurt
them.
Gookin, supra note 132, at 482; see also Canup, supra note 132, at 186-87.
'4 Lepore, supra note 44, at 121 (quoting Joshua Moodey).
'4Canup, supra note 132, at 196-97 (quoting Increase Mather).
, Lepore, supra note 44, at 7-8, 11; see also Canup, supra note 132, at 194 ("When
they seized the Sword of the Wilderness from the Indians' hands, it proved doubleedged: as the colonists cut down the savage scourge, they also cut more of their ties to
inherited cultural traditions. In victory, there was still defeat.").
'4 Lepore, supra note 44, at 11; Slotkin, supra note 44, at 42; Donagan, supra note
141, at 1146.
We saw a similar response to the Abu Ghraib abuses in 2004-05.
'"Slotkin, supra note 44, at 22, 56, 67-68 ("The Indian wars, in which culture was
pitted against culture, afforded a perfect opportunity for this sort of definition by repudiation.").
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distinguishing themselves from Indians. 49 This cultural linedrawing took place on a physically altered landscape largely
cleared of Native Americans, a bounded colony where life inside
"the hedge"'1 no longer carried the existential threats of the wilderness. In this New World, Puritans could flourish as landowners--even love the landl'5 -and in a way they had to. The more
English they were in their commitment to their property, the less
savage they could believe that they had been.'52
Among the first settlers on the American frontier, personhood
in property developed out of routine transactions, the freedom and
prosperity that could be enjoyed in the New World, and the pleasures and challenges of community-building. But at the same time,
it also had roots in the bloodiest of conflicts, in dynamics of rage
and redemption that repeated themselves for centuries. The fact
that Americans have traditionally invested themselves in their
property reflects a complex and ambiguous legacy. As the Puritans
came to learn, personhood can take root in the unlikeliest of soils.

9
.,
Id. at 91 ("In order to create a world of divine law pure and simple, they had to
subject themselves in part to the law of the devil."). We could call this atrocity and
propriety.
"P°Id. at 165.
Id. at 21.
152See Lepore, supra note 44, at 175.
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THE BOUNDS: 153 How PROPERTY LAW NEGOTIATES
THE ATROCITY VALUE

As the previous Sections suggest, personhood in property has a
dark side. Property has a special significance in American culture
in part because our ancestors killed for it, and even today, personhood can be the product of self-justifying behavior, as owners conflate unneighborly and even violent conduct with their property
..I take this phrase from the practice of medieval English villagers who would ritually walk along the borders of their lands, spanking, boxing, dunking, and bumping
their children at various points along the way to teach them the property boundaries.
See Eve Darian-Smith, Beating the Bounds: Law, Identity, and Territory in the New
Europe, in Ethnography in Unstable Places: Everyday Lives in Contexts of Dramatic
Political Change 249, 249 (Carol J. Greenhouse et al. eds., 2002); John Gilbert, A Picture Story Book of London; or, City Scenes 140 (1866) ("'Twas once the plan / To
seize any man / Or little boy they could find, / And bump him down, / Upon the hard
stone, / To fix the said spot in his mind."); George C. Homans, English Villagers of
the Thirteenth Century 368 (1941). The practice is related to rituals surrounding the
moment when ownership of property changed hands, the feoffment of the livery of
seisin. The feoffment was enacted and symbolized with an exchange of twigs and
clods of dirt, but in medieval England and elsewhere in Europe, the parties to the
transaction often marked the occasion by beating children. See J. John Lawler & Gail
Gates Lawler, A Short Historical Introduction to the Law of Real Property 41-42
(1940). What explains the literal presence of pain upon the transfer of seisin-an utterly primitive ritual alongside a quintessentially modern one? The conventional and
contemporaneous explanation, undoubtedly true, is that the beatings created a longstanding memory of the event. Laws of the Salian and Ripuarian Franks 200 (Theodore John Rivers trans., 1986); Emily Zack Tabuteau, Transfers of Property in Eleventh-Century Norman Law 150 (1988). I would argue that the choice to mark the
occasion with pain rather than, say, laughter had an additional set of functions, subtler
than memorialization but easily as important. On the one hand, beating a child made
an unmistakable statement to the outside world, cf. Rose, Possession, supra note 35,
at 77 (describing ownership as a set of communicative acts), embodying and announcing the sovereign power of the owner. The act warned all witnesses of what an owner
was empowered, expected, and encouraged to do to anyone who interfered with his
property. At the same time, inflicting pain on an innocent also affected a new owner's
relationship to his land, or at least to his role as landowner. As I read it, the beating
became the first true statement of the stakes of ownership. In gaining a property right,
a new owner was responsible for hurting a child, often his own. Tabuteau, supra, at
153. By embracing the often violent responsibilities of ownership, see, e.g., Edward L.
Rubin, Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law for the Modern State 300
(2005), he could prove that the beating was not in vain-it had a righteous purpose,
and the child simply made a momentary sacrifice for the good of the community. An
irresponsible owner, however, was someone who in retrospect beat a child for no
good reason; he had done something sinful, if not existentially ruinous. See generally
James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the
Criminal Trial (2008). The violence of the ritual worked to create a more personally
invested owner.

HeinOnline -- 98 Va. L. Rev. 666 2012

Atrocity, Entitlement

2012]

667

rights and identities as owners. Yet property is not a violent institution. It enables thousands of peaceful and voluntary transactions
every day. Many aspects of property law enhance economic efficiency and promote democratic values by resolving conflicts before
they arise and forming a ready framework for cooperation and
community. The personhood that arises from atrocious behavior
presents a challenge to property law. Sometimes the parties to a
dispute have long histories and even family ties, and their property
conflicts are deeply personal. Often the parties are stuck together
in their relationships as neighbors. It is not a given that a ruling will
end the feuding or petty indignities that can mark a post-litigation
relationship."
The Part that follows explores several contexts in which atrocity
fosters personhood and discusses how property cases manage these
situations. It reveals how personhood claims are widespread and
challenges the idea that a decision that recognizes and protects
personhood would track the progressive or sociable side of an issue. Property law often checks atrocious behavior, but not through
decisions that address personhood directly. This Part traces how
property has domesticated and curbed atrocity by considering customary common property, trespass and adverse possession, and
nuisance and takings.
M

A. The Social Dynamics of Custom-Based Common Property
For many years the default wisdom in property scholarship was
that public ownership inevitably devolves into a "tragedy of the
commons."'55 Over the past two decades, however, social scientists
and legal scholars have refined our understanding of the commons,
distinguishing conventionally tragic "open access resources" from

"'The famous Hatfield-McCoy feud in late nineteenth-century Appalachia began
after a lawsuit about lumber rights was decided. See Altina L. Waller, Feud: Hatfields, McCoys, and Social Change in Appalachia, 1860-1900, at 2, 41 (1988); see also
James C. Smith, Tulk v. Moxhay: The Fight to Develop Leicester Square, in Property
Stories 188 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009) (describing two
hundred years of litigation over the same piece of land in London).
,'Rose, Comedy, supra note 35. Until a series of cases in the 1970s relating to beach
access, Carol Rose observed, custom had "almost no authority in American law." Id.
at 713-17; see also Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881) (noting "extremely
limited" circumstances for following custom).
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156
more functional and ably managed "common pool resources.'
Collective ownership has often worked well and, it turns out, has
long had a place in American life and law. In her classic article The
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Public Policy,
Carol Rose explored traditions of common ownership. Rose argued that customary uses of common property revealed the purpose and utility of common rights to land. The fact that such customary uses existed-the very fact that communities were "capable
of generating [their] own customs"-showed how "even with respect to scarce resources, a commons need not be a wasteland of
uncertain or conflicting property claims."'5 7 Invoking specific customary uses such as roads, tidal lands and waterways, and recreational lands for "maypole dances, horse races, cricket matches, and
the like,"' 58 Rose suggested that at a basic level common ownership
contributed to commerce "our quintessential mode of sociability.' ' 59 Public rights to land are a powerful "social glue" that "trains
us in the democratic give-and-take that makes our regime function. ,,"6
Rose's view of custom, common ownership, and sociability provides an inspiring insight for progressive scholars of the "human
flourishing-minded social-obligation" stripe,"' who have cited her
work in highlighting legal rules that have favored public access
over the right to exclude in cases involving recreational uses.'62 The
success of customary common ownership shows how the Law and
Economics conception of property as a response to resource scarcity is necessarily linked to the social function of property, or what
Jedediah Purdy elegantly described as our "imaginative and moral
investment in these 'resources.""'63 Customary common ownership

"'Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 48 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990). Rose uses the term
"managed commons." Rose, Comedy, supra note 35, at 749; see also Henry E. Smith,
Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. Legal Stud.
131, 132-34 (2000).
157Rose, Comedy, supra note 35, at 743.
"'Id. at 741.

See id. at 776.
See id. at 779-80.

161Alexander, supra
162Id. at 801-10.

note 24, at 808.

6'Jedediah Purdy, A Foxy Hedgehog: The Consistent Perceptions of Carol Rose,
19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1033,1034 (2011).
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helps us begin to understand how the classical assumption of a
world of rational, self-interested utility maximizers cannot explain
the origins of property-that in the beginning a system of property
law requires "a community in which cooperation is possible."'
Customary common regimes reveal property's role in constructing
communities, how its connection to personal identity moves into a
larger sphere of community identity. Common pool resources have
emerged as one of the happier, more sociable accounts of property,
a compelling, functional model of how a progressive vision imbued
with civic virtue and democratic values can work for today's law. 6 '
But the sense of personhood and community created by common property regimes does not always arise from the positive
things that communities do. Common property regimes depend on
management by "an easily identifiable group of insiders";" blocking access by outsiders is part of what distinguishes a commons
from a "tragic" open access resource. Violence can serve a dual
purpose: to keep outsiders out, but also to cement in-group loyalty.
The commons is not just the market grounds or fields for a maypole dance or horse race. 67 It also includes the hanging tre&.
' Rose, supra note 37, at 39.
165

See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 24, at 801-07.

'Thniinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in Property Rights:
Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 73, 76 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney
eds., 2003); see also Ostrom, supra note 156, at 21.
,6Rose, Comedy, supra note 35, at 741.
1'6
During the half-century epidemic of lynching in the American South from 1880 to
1930, thousands of extra-legal murders were not only ritualized trials and executions,
but also ritualized picnics. See Davarian L. Baldwin, Our Newcomers to the City: The
Great Migration and the Making of Modern Mass Culture, in Beyond Blackface: African Americans and the Creation of American Popular Culture, 1890-1930, at 159,
167 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 2011) ("Lynching had become the country's most
'Deadly Amusement,' with white families bringing children and picnic baskets and
helping to transform many a black southerner into a northern migrant."). Members of
the mob took their families along, bought food from vendors, collected gruesome
souvenirs, and had pictures taken by roving photographers that they proudly mailed
out as postcards. As these atrocities repeated themselves somewhere in the South
every two or three days, lynching was routinely associated with recreation and outdoor space, fields and trees. See, e.g., Abel Meeropol, Strange Fruit, reprinted in
David Margolick, Strange Fruit: Billie Holiday, Caf6 Society, and an Early Cry for
Civil Rights 15 (2000). If we conceive of white social privilege not simply as property,
see, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709, 1709 (1993),
but as a commons, atrocity helped make it functional and natural. It was undoubtedly
a "social glue" that unified segregated communities.
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The violence at the edge of some common regimes is vividly
borne out by journalistic and anthropological accounts of Hawaiian
surfer gangs who beat up outsiders and Maine lobstermen who
protect informal territorial boundaries by cutting the lines of rival
fishermen and even burning rival boats and docks.169 What is fascinating about this connection between violence and the commons is
not just the existence or character of the bad deeds. What is especially important to keep in mind is that everyone knows the stakes.
Warring lobster gangs know that their actions and reactions have
the result of keeping people just like them from feeding their families. 7 ' But they do it anyway. And the result is that the lobstermen
are even more committed to fighting for their fishing territory, and
the commons continues to thrive without the "tragic" consequences of resource depletion and underinvestment.
As Carol Rose has noted, American courts from the beginning
have suspected that customary common regimes can be "mired in
the swamps of medieval feudalism, hierarchy, and rigidity" and
"incompatible with democratic forms of government."'' Property
law addresses the downsides of the commons in several ways. In
most contexts, property law simply refuses to recognize informal
commons arrangements. The Maine lobstermen know that their
violence has dire consequences for the victims and that it is punishable under criminal law. Just as importantly, they know that their
territories have no legal sanction.
169James

M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine 74 (1988); Benjamin Marcus,

Extreme Surf 82 (2009) ("Surfing localism takes many forms, from verbal threats to
punchouts to torched cars[,] ... thefts, vandalism, gangs, terroristic threats, and physical violence. Everything from graffiti to murder, and which has spread across the surfing world from Angourie to Zihuatenejo."); see also M. De Alessi, The Customs and
Culture of Surfing, and an Opportunity for a New Territorialism?, 1 Reef J. 85, 88
(2009); Carol M. Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the New Law and Economics of Property, 79 Or. L. Rev. 479, 486 (2000) ("As affectionate and appealing as
[Acheson's] portrait may be, however, it has a downside: from a more skeptical perspective the Monhegan fishermen look xenophobic, misogynistic, and bullyingcharacteristics rather reminiscent of the historic American legal concerns about customary
law.").
170 Acheson, supra note 169, at 75.
171Rose, supra note 169, at 486 ("The judges saw these community practices as
mired in the swamps of medieval feudalism, hierarchy, and rigidity; in particular, they
thought that customary law was incompatible with democratic forms of government,

in which communities pass laws for themselves not by looking to the past, but rather
by looking to the open actions of democratically-elected representatives.").
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While the judicial skepticism about customary regimes may be
taking aim at their worst impulses, the cases rarely attempt to distinguish good from bad kinds of personhood, or sociable from unsociable regimes.'72 Rather, the blanket suspicion of customary regimes has more to do with questions of internal governance. When
property law sanctions common property arrangements-including
concurrent and marital ownership, condominiums and cooperatives, and corporations-Professors Hanoch Dagan and Michael
Heller have shown the importance of the possibility of exit and of
governance structures and procedural transparency that aligns
these arrangements with democratic norms.'73 Within these bounds,
the courts give great latitude to these communities. They can still
engage in and gain identity from acts that come at the expense of
the personhood of individuals-often individual members of the
group' 74-but the types of these acts and their consequences are
bounded by the procedural requirements. Put another way, when a
cat lover sneaks three kittens into her unit in a pet-free condominium complex, members of the community do not affirm their commitment to a pet-free life by acting violently towards the cats or
their owner.' Instead, they follow a set of rules and levy fines, and
if the cat lover does not like it, she can sell her stake and leave.
Both violence and fines reinforce a community's pet-free identity,
and both are hurtful to the cat lover's identity. But the law's procedural and exit requirements steer the community towards a balanced path that, while not addressing personhood directly, arguably protects the personhood of both sides of such conflicts.

172

Cf. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 161-62 (D. Mass. 1881) (describing the rare circum-

stances
in which courts defer to a customary regime).
73
Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 Yale L.J. 549,
567, 594-95 (2001); see also Rose, supra note 169, at 486.
114 The personhood of individual residents targeted by their common interest communities can arise from ennobling activities like pet ownership, see, e.g., Nahrstedt v.
Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1277-78 (Cal. 1994), but people can also
define themselves by the antagonistic relationships they make within their communities. See, for example, the conduct of the defendant in 40 West 67th St. v. Pullman, 790
N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (N.Y. 2003), or the recent allegations against Anthony Michael
Hall in Andrew Blankstein, Actor Anthony Michael Hall Arrested in Dispute with
Neighbor, L.A. Now Blog (Sept. 6, 2011, 7:36 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
lanow/2011/09/actor-anthony-michael-hall-arrested-in-dispute-with-neighbor.html.
,75Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1277-78.
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In at least one circumstance in which a court has sanctioned a
customary public right, the case reveals the difficulty of discerning
amiable from atrocious manifestations of personhood, as well as
the utility of procedural clarity and exit rules in domesticating potentially violent customs. In the 1818 case McConico v. Singleton,'76
a property owner in the South Carolina interior'77 warned a man
not to hunt deer in his forest, and when the interloper ignored him,
he sued for trespass. It was a pure, face-to-face exercise of the right
to exclude, but the landowner's claim failed at trial and on appeal.
A jury and eventually the state's Constitutional Court of Appeals
endorsed a broad right to hunt on "unenclosed and unimproved
lands." "The forest was regarded as a common," the court wrote,
"and it will not be denied that animals ... are common property,
and belong to the first taker."'78 Not only was the right customary,
"universally exercised from the first settlement of the country up to
the present time," according to the court, 7' but just as important,
hunting had a central role in promoting and protecting the American republic. Because, the court noted, "[1]arge standing armies
are, perhaps, wisely considered as dangerous to our free institutions," the forests were the militia's training ground, "necessarily
constitut[ing] our greatest security against aggression.""
Linking public land rights to civic responsibility and the foundation of democratic government, McConico's language suggests that
hunting rights deserve protection because they are so noble. Decided not four years after the end of the War of 1812, the ruling
had an obvious, intuitive logic. In a broader historical context,
however, the rights that were vindicated by the court take on a
more ambiguous valence. Fifty years earlier, in almost the exact
same place where the events in McConico unfolded, hunting meant
something completely different. After a Cherokee war devastated
the South Carolina backcountry in 1760-61, local farmers endured
17

9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 245 (1818).

77

' A will transcript available online from the South Carolina Department of Archives & History places McConico in the Sumter District of Clarendon County,
roughly midway between Myrtle Beach and Columbia. Alexander Colclough, Will
Transcript,
at
2,
Nov.
7,
1817,
ser.
S108093,
available
at
http://www.archivesindex.sc.gov.
McConico, 9 S.C.L. at 245.
171Id. at 244.
1. Id. at 246.
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years of thefts and physical attacks.18 ' Cattle- and horse-rustling became epidemic, and stories abounded of torture, rape, and kidnapping by roving criminal gangs. Landowners had their eyes gouged
out, their bodies branded with hot irons." Although debtors, runaway slaves, and escaped felons had gravitated towards the area
following the collapse of civil society, Professor Rachel Klein has
described how the victimized population as often as not identified
the root of the problem differently: hunters were the ones responsible. Those who hunted to survive were, as a general matter, landless with no "visible way of getting an honest living," a group that
was expanding in the 1760s because of the lingering effects of the
Cherokee War and of two serious droughts.'83 Backcountry farmers
and colonial leaders alike decried the "wandering indolence of
hunting," a drunken, squalid, "sluttish" lifestyle that produced
people who were "little more than white Indians."'" It was a short
step from hunting and foraging to poaching and outright invasion,
and hunters often were found abetting or participating in the
criminal gangs.' Hunters brought South Carolina to the brink of
collapse.'" There and elsewhere, statutes enacted during the colonial and early republic periods repeatedly targeted not only those
who were "killing Deer at Unreasonable Times," but also those
...
Richard Maxwell Brown, The South Carolina Regulators 34-37 (1963); Rachel N.
Klein, Unification of a Slave State: The Rise of the Planter Class in the South Carolina Backcountry, 1760-1808, at 38-39 (1990); Sharfstein, supra note 103, at 15.
'2 Brown, supra note 181, at 36.
"'Id. at 49; Klein, supra note 181, at 54.
"4Klein, supra note 181, at 51, 54 ("In 1750, the speaker of the [South Carolina] assembly told of the 'many hundred men whom we know little of and are little the better, for they kill deer and live like Indians."').
...
Id. at 59-61.
186 Farmers in the South Carolina backcountry responded to the threat posed by
hunters with a massive escalation of the daily violence of frontier life. Forming vigilante militias in 1767, landowners calling themselves "Regulators" went on a yearlong rampage of hanging, shooting, and whipping men and women in hunting communities. Regulators burned itinerant settlements and forced vagrants, broadly defined, to work on farms. Although colonial authorities initially sympathized with the
Regulators, the bloodletting became a new threat to the social order, pushing South
Carolina to the brink of civil war. Sharfstein, supra note 103, at 16. The violence attendant to hunting may have created social cohesion among hunters and enabled
them to make strong claims for their customary rights. But at the same time, as the
victims and victimizers of hunters, backcountry landowners also strengthened their
community and rights consciousness. Both effects are on display in the conflict at the
root of McConico.
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who simply were "Supporting themselves.., by Hunting being
People of loose disorderly Lives."'" After the Revolution, even
committed patriots understood hunters to be, in the words of
Crevecoeur, "[o]ur bad people.""
Yet just fifty years after the South Carolina unrest-a generation
after Crevecoeur's assessment-hunting was quintessentially
American, according to McConico, a paradigmatic example of how
customary common rights could work for the country's benefit and
survival, even define its identity. This radical shift suggests the difficulty of making a judgment about whether this kind of common
right deserves suspicion or sanction. Given the ubiquity of hunting,
the difficulty of policing it, and arguably a commitment to hunting
rights forged in a crucible of violence, it made sense for the South
Carolina court to embrace hunting rather than to engage in a fight
that could undermine the legitimacy of the law.'89 At the same time,
by leaving open the possibility that owners could restrict hunting
by enclosure or cultivation, rules that evolved into laws that allow
owners to post signs forbidding trespass or hunting, the court clarified procedures that tamed the interaction between hunters and
owners: a default that can be exited. McConico did not try to separate out friendly from nasty hunters. By not weighing personhood
directly-a difficult task in any case given the varieties of personhood and competing claims-the court allowed both owners and
hunters to retain a personal stake in the regime.
B. Exclusion and Incursion
1. Exclusion and Civil Rights: The Atrocity Value in Trespass
It is commonly understood that the right to exclude is, as Professor Thomas Merrill argues, "the sine qua non" of property." Although exclusion can be understood as an indirect "means to an
end" that efficiently protects uses that can promote human flour1'

Klein, supra note 181, at 53.

18 Id.

at 53-54 n.13.

89

Cf. "castle doctrine," supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 730
(1998). The persistence of this view is all the more remarkable given the sustained intellectual critique of the primacy of exclusion. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in Liberty, Property, and the Law: Modern Understandings of
Liberty and Property (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000).
'

'90Thomas
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ishing-"[n]o one except a fetishist would believe that exclusion is
a positive good," Henry Smith writes9'-acting as a gatekeeper and
protecting one's boundaries does bond a person to her property
independent of use." Most notably in areas relating to race in
American history, the pure exercise of exclusion rights has fostered
personhood. Some of these personhood claims have arisen from
the kinds of civil- and human rights-affirming contexts familiar to
the literature on personhood. But personhood can also spring from
much uglier exercises of the right to exclude. The Subsections that
follow consider the personhood that can arise from exclusion and
how property law contends with its multiple valences. Property law
directly regulates some of the most hurtful behaviors with rules
about discrimination and necessity. But even in those areas, it continues to strike balances between competing claims that implicate
personhood.
a. The Right to Exclude and Civil Rights
The right to exclude establishes relationships among landowners, outsiders, and the state that are fundamental to liberty and
equality. 93 An English case from 1814, Merest v. Harvey, provides
an excellent illustration of exclusion's primacy as a core "human
flourishing" property right: A "gentleman of fortune" shooting
birds on his land refused a request to join his party made by a man
who was "a banker, a magistrate, and a member of parliament.""' 5
After the interloper went hunting anyway and "used very intemperate language, threatening, in his capacity of a magistrate, to
commit the Plaintiff, and defying him to bring any action," the
landowner sued for trespass and ultimately won the astronomical
19,
Smith,

supra note 34, at 964; see also Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature

of Property, 1 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 69, 76-80 (2005).
, Cf. Floyd W. Rudmin, "To Own Is To Be Perceived to Own": A Social Cognitive
Look at the Ownership of Property, in To Have Possessions: A Handbook on Ownership and Property 85, 92 (Rudmin ed., 1991) (describing as a "paradox of property"

the notion that "[t]he more secure a possession is, as property, the less attention the
owner directs to it").
193Merrill, supra note 190, at 735.
194128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814), 5 Taunt. 442. Merest is featured prominently in
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., the first case excerpted in Merrill & Smith, supra
note 67, 1-7.
19 Merest, 5 Taunt. at 442.

HeinOnline -- 98 Va. L. Rev. 675 2012

676

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 98:635

sum of five hundred pounds. 96 Affirming the damages award, Merest suggests that without a robust right to exclude, a society would
be beholden to might and the demands of the state and could easily
degenerate into violence."9 A right to exclude makes differences in
social status functionally irrelevant. It does not matter if some own
more land than others or hold positions of power. Every property
holder is an independent sovereign, a nominal equality that makes
a liberal republic possible.9 When Crevecoeur wrote shortly after
the American Revolution that it is the "formerly rude soil" that
"has established all our rights; on it is founded our rank, our freedom, our power as citizens,"'" he was describing, at root, what
flows from being able to exclude people from one's land." °
The right to exclude has continued to play a role in the way
Americans relate to their land, no more so than in the history of
African American freedom. If slavery meant the negation of exclusion rights, freedom was synonymous with the integrity and importance of boundaries."' During the civil rights era, black-owned
property became essential organizing spaces throughout the South,
places where civil rights workers could stay and where meetings
could take place, safely and quietly." Veteran protesters such as
Curtis Murphy, who participated in the 1960 Nashville sit-in campaign, were raised with the notion:

'9Id. at 442-43.
97
"'
Id. at 444 (Heath, J.) (upholding the award because such damages worked to
"prevent the practice of duelling").
198
Jefferson, supra note 101, at 275.
'9 Crevecoeur, supra note 57, at 27.
2°Being landless, by contrast, meant dependency. Seth Rockman, Scraping By:
Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore 1-2, 53-54, 75-76 (2009).
20'Land ownership was a central priority of newly freed slaves, and the nation's ultimate failure to distribute confiscated Confederate land to them after the Civil War
has had far-reaching and continuing social effects. See Melinda C. Miller, Land and
Racial Wealth Inequality, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 371 (2011), available
at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.3.371. African Americans
whose ancestors did manage to acquire property in the nineteenth century are far less
likely to be on the wrong side of the wealth gap that continues to divide black from
white. Id. For a discussion of the wealth gap, see Dalton Conley, Being Black, Living
in the Red: Race, Wealth, and Social Policy in America 1 (1999); Melvin L. Oliver &
Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality 2 (rev. ed. 2006).
m See, e.g., Branch, supra note 9, at 57-58.
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If you owned your own land, then you were the master of your
own destiny or as close as any black man could be to being his
own master. "Every man should have his own piece of dirt. If you
do that, if you own it, no other man, no matter what his color,
can make you step off it," [Murphy's father] liked to say.' °3
To the contrary, a black landowner could force whites to leave.
Land ownership with exclusion rights meant freedom and possibly
even equality, and it defined who and what people aspired to be.
b. The Right to Exclude and Segregation
At the same time that the right to exclude became central to African American identity, it was also central to a segregationist
white identity. Being able to exclude blacks from neighborhoods,
churches, and business establishments helped constitute white
privilege, and exclusion had little to do with use. Interestingly,
when Margaret Jane Radin considered whether free speech rights
should trump state trespass law on commercial property such as
shopping centers, she cited Bell v. Maryland ' as a case where a
"personhood perspective" was of limited use."5 Bell, involving
trespass charges against sit-in protesters whom a Baltimore restaurant owner refused to serve "solely on the basis of their color,"' 6
raised the difficult question for Radin of whether "a proprietor
could argue that she had her personhood bound up with being able
to exclude blacks."2 '° Noting that the "case is arguably a standoff
from the perspective of personhood if we imagine a small proprietor whose prejudice is non-commercial and whose personhood is
inseparable from the business," Radin sidestepped the troubling
nature of such a personhood claim in favor of "other moral arguments" that compelled access. 8
Nevertheless, Bell provides Radin's only acknowledgment that
the personhood bound up in exclusion rights could work as a broad
license to be exclusionary. Owners can exercise their exclusion
Halberstam, The Children 362-63 (1998).
378 U.S. 226 (1964).
203 Radin, supra note 19, at 1010-11.
206Bell, 378 U.S. at 227-28.
207 Radin, supra note 19, at 1011.
203David

Id. The Supreme Court also sidestepped the question. Note that subsequently enacted state law and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 mooted the issue.
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rights in hurtful and even deadly ways, and the pain that they inflict
can contribute to their personal identification with their property
and to their commitment to being effective gatekeepers."l Exercising the right to exclude is one of the key expressive acts that signal
possession."' People can define themselves as individuals and as
owners against those whom they keep off their land."' Given the
stakes, property law directly intervenes to regulate away the worst
exclusionary impulses. Doctrines of necessity trump exclusion
when life and limb are on the line, and public accommodations and
fair housing laws bluntly target the link between exclusion and personhood." 2
But property law still strikes balances to keep even the losers in
necessity and antidiscrimination cases invested in the larger property regime. In situations involving necessity, courts may require
trespassers to pay for any damage they cause."' And while the Fair
Housing Act aspired to change segregated norms over time" ' and
ultimately to disaggregate exclusion and personhood, exemptions
such as the for-sale-by-owner and "Mrs. Murphy" provisions...
show a continuing interest in keeping owners, even the racist ones,
personally invested in their property. If personhood was, as Radin
suggests, not a good basis for deciding trespass cases involving sitin protesters, it does seem to be accounted for and represented in
the compromises between access and exclusion that property law
makes.

209See, e.g., Barros, Home, supra note 18, at 260
2o Rose, Possession, supra note 35, at 76.
21.
Cf. Stephen Birmingham, "Our Crowd": The

(castle doctrine).
Great Jewish Families of New York

3 (1967) ("By the late 1930's the world of Mrs. Philip J. Goodhart had become one of
clearly defined, fixed, and immutable values. There were two kinds of people. There
were 'people we visit' and 'people we wouldn't visit.' She was not interested in 'people we wouldn't visit.').
2,2
See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908); Smith, supra note 34, at 964.
213Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910); Merrill &
Smith, supra note 67, at 441-42.
24 Note the persistence of housing segregation more than forty years later. Craig
Gurian, New Maps Show Segregation Alive and Well, Remapping Debate (Apr. 20,
2011), http://bit.ly/dE2ni9.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2006).
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2. Adverse Possession
a. Good Faith, Bad Faith, and Personhood
No property doctrine threatens to reward bad behavior more
than adverse possession, which awards title to a trespasser who
openly and notoriously occupies land for a set period of years. Although hornbook law and a majority of states have objective tests
that define any non-permissive possession as "adverse under a
claim of right," judges and juries have traditionally resisted what
could appear to be legally sanctioned theft. Instead, they have imported a subjective "good faith" requirement favoring people who
had reason to think that the land they were occupying actually belonged to them."6 Intriguingly, when cases that emit a whiff of bad
faith succeed, it is often because the relevant facts have been finessed or even re-characterized as good-faith conduct."'
In the last five years, the rationales for affirming the possessors'
good faith have become far less intuitive, as several insightful articles have explored why the claims of bad-faith adverse possessors
deserve to succeed. While Professor Lee Anne Fennell has made a
utilitarian argument for bad-faith adverse possession as "efficient
trespass, '...' Professors Eduardo Pefialver and Sonia Katyal justified the practice on the "nonconsequentialist" ground that squatting has allowed people who are "disenfranchised from institutionalized structures.., to challenge both existing property rules and
established property entitlements." Bad-faith adverse possession,
they contend, "served a fairly important redistributive function and
constituted a significant threat to absentee ownership."2 '9
Pefialver and Katyal conceive of and weigh the redistributive
function of adverse possession not only in terms of land, but also in
6

Richard H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 Wash. U.
L.Q. 331, 358 (1983) ("Judges and juries.., do take 'subjective factors' into account
when these can be proved or inferred from the evidence. And they do regularly prefer
the claims of an honest man over those of a dishonest man."). But see Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor Helmholz,
64 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 23-46 (1986).
217 See, e.g., Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 54 (1837); Merrill
&
Smith, supra note 67, at 194-200.
...
Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse Possession, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1037, 1038 (2006).
, 19Eduardo Mois6s Pefialver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1095,1130-32, 1170-71 (2007).
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terms of personhood, because adverse possession leads to ownership, which "is uniquely essential to the construction of personal
identity" and "develops our capacity to act as autonomous beings."22 But the connection between adverse possession and personhood is more direct than that. The very process of adversely
possessing property fosters personhood, which itself becomes a justification for adverse possession. Although the doctrine has traditionally been rationalized on the utilitarian grounds that it promotes effective gate-keeping by owners and lowers information
costs for third parties, Oliver Wendell Holmes famously recognized
in The Path of the Law that
[a] thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being
and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask
no better justification than the deepest instincts of man. 1
Adverse possession gives rise to personal identification with property as a result of the long time horizons involved, and also from
the fact that it essentially requires successful claimants to "have enjoyed and used" the land "as [their] own."
Scholars have suggested that the personhood value would be
stronger in cases of good-faith adverse possession, but the opposite
position-that personhood arises from bad faith-is not difficult to
understand. Although Radin finds it hard to imagine "how one's
personhood can become bound up with the ownership of something unless she thinks she owns it, ' there are reasons to expect
that a bad-faith owner could identify aggressively with her property. A good-faith owner may well appreciate a few extra inches on
her side of a misplaced fence in the same way that she conceives of
220Id. at 1130-32.
221Oliver

Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897);

see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907), quoted
in Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 669
n.183 (1988).
222Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 739,
749 (1986). Although Radin notes that "it seems Hegel contemplated that binding
yourself to an object you know is not yours in fact will ultimately make it yours[,]
[sitill it seems personality theory is more comfortable with the 'color of title' case than
with 'squatters."' Id.
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the rest of her land.223 But a bad-faith possessor who aspires to anything more than a temporary squat has little choice and every incentive to commit herself wholly to the land. Through personally
invested ownership, a bad-faith possessor appears more to courts
and the rest of the world like a responsible gatekeeper favored by
the legal doctrine. And for someone who has stolen land, proper
stewardship can become its own justification for possessing the
property.
b. "PropertyOutlaws" and Personhood
Despite the economic efficiencies and potential redistributive effects of bad-faith adverse possession, it would be a serious mistake
to soft-pedal the conduct at issue. In their account of "property
outlaws," Pefialver and Katyal draw on several examples that seem
to have some progressive, or at least romantic, allure: the American Indian Movement occupiers of Alcatraz in the 1970s, nineteenth-century Western pioneers, civil-rights-era sit-in protesters,
and urban squatters in New York in the 1980s. With the caveat that
they are "under no illusions that property outlaws will always pursue ends that we consider good or worthy," Pefialver and Katyal
argue that "[t]he nature of property lawbreaking suggests that it
will be used by non-owners more than owners and by those isolated from the majoritarian process more than by those well connected to the levers of power., 24 Regarding the case of Western
homesteaders, critics have taken issue with Pefialver and Katyal's
choice to frame the history as a conflict between absentee land
speculators and landless settlers, or in other words, as a manifestation of the question of "whether public lands should be used as a
source of revenue to help pay off the national debt, or as a reservoir of public largess with which to create a nation of Jeffersonian
small-holding property owners." 25 Pefialver and Katyal readily acknowledge that when understood as a conflict between settlers and
the original Native American inhabitants, the story is less inspir-

" See Rudmin, supra note 192 (discussing the connection between secure possession and indifference).
22 Pefialver & Katyal, supra note 219, at 1137.
Id. at 1106-07; Greg Lastowka, Property Outlaws, Rebel Mythologies, and Social
Bandits, 20 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 377, 383 (2010).
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ing. 26 The settlement of the West may be a history of adverse possession from absentee owners, 227 but on a day-to-day level, it involved the deadly work of expelling Native Americans from their
land. 2n
The experience of black property owners in the postReconstruction South provides a clearer example of the legacy of
property outlaws, with no absentee owners to cloud the moral picture. It is no coincidence that the moment when African Americans were first able to participate in the property market in any
appreciable number was also the moment when extrajudicial killing became a way of life in the South. 229 Across the decades, a large
number of lynchings were related to property and the threat that
black landownership posed to the prevailing social order. 3° In rural
areas, towns, and cities across the region, concentrations of black
ownership were repeatedly uprooted by mobs that shot, hanged,
and burned individual victims and torched and terrorized entire
communities. 3 Sometimes survivors made quick sales at deep discounts, reflecting the necessity of fleeing, if not outright coercion. 2
Other times, land was simply abandoned and lost through adverse
possession or sold at tax auctions.233 In such instances, the true
owners were not mere absentees-they were refugees-and the

22 6
See Lastowka, supra note 225, at 387; Pefialver & Katyal, supra note 219, at 1106;
Eduardo M. Pefialver, Response, 20 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 393, 395-96 (2010).
227 See Donald J. Pisani, Squatter Law in California, 1850-1856, 25 W. Hist. Q. 277,

292, 299 (1994) (documenting judicial and legislative efforts to expand "squatters'
rights" of adverse possession in California).
See Lastowka, supra note 225, at 387 (describing Western settlement as "local
might making local right").
" Loren Schweninger, Black Property Owners in the South, 1790-1915, at 151-52,
228 (1990). See generally Crystal N. Feimster, Southern Horrors: Women and the
Politics of Rape and Lynching 158-85 (2009) (discussing lynchings).
'30 See, e.g., Mia Bay, To Tell the Truth Freely: The Life of Ida B. Wells 82-85
(2009) (recounting the tragic story of three black proprietors of a grocery store in
Memphis, Tennessee, who were arrested and lynched after a "riot" precipitated by a
white rival grocer).
'31 See, e.g., Carrie A. Russell, Reckoning with a Violent and Lawless Past: A Study
of Race, Violence and Reconciliation in Tennessee 8-14 (August 2010) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University) (on file with the Jean & Alexander Heard
Library, Vanderbilt University) (describing the lynching of a black property owner in
Erwin, Tennessee and subsequent expulsion of the town's entire black community).
" Id. at 12, 40 n.17, 159.
'3' Id. at 40.

HeinOnline -- 98 Va. L. Rev. 682 2012

2012]

Atrocity, Entitlement

''outlaws" were not effecting the progressive redistribution of
property.
The communities that expropriated land in the West and the
South justified their conduct in many ways, most notably by defining their victims as outsiders undeserving of property rights." One
could also imagine, as the mob in Greenwood, Mississippi did, violent expropriation contributing to a personal connection to the
land that further justified the taking, at least to the takers. To the
extent that adverse possession fosters personhood in both goodand bad-faith contexts, the law's formal neutrality on the question
of state of mind in most jurisdictions, coupled with an informal
preference for good faith, serves multiple purposes. Even as it
checks the worst kinds of expropriations, it continues to guide even
bad-faith expropriators, over time, towards behaving like proper
owners. Adverse possession doctrine does not function solely to
deter lax gate-keeping. It also works to create the right kind of
owners out of land thieves and squatters.
C. Personhoodand Conflicts Over Incompatible Uses: Nuisance
and Regulatory Takings
1. Nuisance
Alongside the right to exclude, the right to use one's land is a
core property right, directly related to how people conceive of
themselves. Nuisance law both protects usage rights and limits
them, regulating, among other things, activities on one's land that
intentionally, substantially, and unreasonably interfere with another owner's use and enjoyment. Nuisance creates a framework to
resolve disputes that routinely arise from incompatible land uses.
But the doctrine is also necessary because some conflicts take on a
momentum and logic of their own, fraught with the potential for
self-justifying behavior, creating situations in which people derive
satisfaction from hurting their neighbors. While stories of squabbling neighbors can appear comically trivial, they can contain real
aggression and present seemingly incompatible versions of personhood. In such circumstances, it may be difficult to decide cases di-

On the ubiquity of "othering" in the history of violent expropriations in the
United States, see Rose, supra note 77, at 28-29.
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rectly on the basis of personhood, but nuisance law can manage the
worst behavior by owners while still affirming a sense that they
have a robust right to use their property.
Consider, for example, the case of Bobbe Ernst, an accomplished player of the marimba who drove her neighbors to distraction by loudly playing a theme song unique to each of them whenever she saw them nearby.235 Certainly she enjoyed playing the
marimba for its own sake, what the court called its "musical and
melodious" tone, 36 but it is not hard to imagine that she also took
special pleasure from watching her neighbor of six years, a Naval
officer, wince every time the first notes of "Anchors Aweigh"
chimed across the yard. 3 It is a pleasure that is uniquely rooted in
and is a fundamental expression of ownership-Ernst thinks she is
entitled to play "Jingle Bells" every time her pot-bellied, whitebearded neighbor walks by because she owns her property and
supposes she can do what she wants on it. Perhaps, as Professor
Nestor Davidson might suggest, doing something that lowers the
value of a neighbor's property makes one feel richer,238 but even if
that were not the case, there is pride and pleasure to be taken in
the offensive acts that one can only do by virtue of being a property owner. By her logic, it seems, annoying the neighbors is a

'3' Collier v. Ernst, 46 Pa. D. & C. 1, 4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1942). I thank Jon Bruce for
bringing this case to my attention.
' Id. at 2. The marimba is a percussion instrument of Central American and African origin. In an 1888 travelogue, William Eleroy Curtis was particularly impressed
with its ubiquity in Costa Rica:
The marimba is constructed of twenty-one pieces of split bamboo of graded
lengths, strung upon two bars of the same wood according to harmonic sequence, thus furnishing three octaves. Underneath each strip of bamboo is a
gourd, strung upon a wire, which takes the place of a sounding-board, and adds
strength and sweetness to the tones. The performer takes the instrument upon
his knees and strikes the bamboo strips with little hammers of padded leather,
usually taking two between the fingers of each hand, so as to strike a chord of
four notes, which he does with great dexterity. I have seen men play with three
hammers in each hand, and use them as rapidly and skillfully as a pianist
touches his keys. The tones of the marimba resemble those of the xylophone,
which has recently become so popular, except that they are louder and more
resonant.
William Eleroy Curtis, The Capitals of Spanish America 214 (New York, Harper &
Bros. 1888).
7 Collier, 46 Pa. D. & C. at 3.
Davidson, supra note 21, at 760.

HeinOnline -- 98 Va. L. Rev. 684 2012

2012]

Atrocity, Entitlement

power that ownership confers, a power that in turn contributes to
her personal identification with and investment in her property.
Nuisance law can take these conflicts and balance the competing
personhood interests, rather than choosing one set of interests over
the other. In the case of the marimba player, a Pennsylvania court
ruled that her conduct constituted a nuisance, enjoining her jaunty
renditions of "Anchors Aweigh" and "Jingle Bells," as well as
"When Irish Eyes Are Smiling" and "Little Old Lady." 9 But the
injunction only covered certain times of the day, and Ernst was
able to keep her beloved instrument. In the specificity of its decision, the court left open the possibility that in other circumstances
the marimba-playing would be perfectly legal.
At a basic level, nuisance law tracks community norms and
keeps the peace by requiring reasonable behavior. And the doctrine preserves the notion that owners retain broad usage rights. It
does not, for example, touch objectively reasonable acts that may
fall short of "assault by marimba," yet still are aggressive, hurtful,
and unneighborly. The West Virginia man who preemptively drills
a water well on his property line after learning that his neighbor
plans to put a septic tank there is not liable for nuisance,"f because
there is nothing unreasonable about the effects of a water well on a
neighbor's property rights."' Luxury condo owners in downtown
Manhattan had no recourse against chain-smoking neighbors.2" A
Long Island property owner had no claim against a neighbor for
landscaping that featured "unsightly dumpsters, an abandoned icebox, 'automobile hulks,' or a 'hideous rampart of dirt."'243 Nuisance
cases acknowledge how important the right to use is as a personal
matter for individual owners. And they show how difficult it is to
draw lines between reasonable and unreasonable uses. The discre-

" Collier,46 Pa. D. & C. at 9-10.
Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198,203 (W. Va. 1989).
24' In Hendricks, the well was held to be a reasonable use even though there was no
other place on the neighboring property for a septic system. Id. at 200,203.
22 See Ewen v. Maccherone, 927 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276 (N.Y. App. Term 2011) ("IT]he
'40

law of private nuisance would be stretched beyond its breaking point if we-were to
allow a means of recovering damages when a neighbor merely smokes inside his or
her own apartment in a multiple dwelling building. Since there cannot be a substantially unreasonable interference by smoking inside the apartment, there could not be
a rivate nuisance.... ").
z Ruscito v. Swaine, Inc., 793 N.Y.S.2d 475,476-77 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
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tionary balancing that marks many cases allows courts to resolve
disputes and preserve order without lessening the connection, for
better or worse, of use and personhood.
2. Personhoodand Resistance to Regulatory Takings
The question of when the government is constitutionally required to pay "just compensation" for an exercise of the eminent
domain power is both simple and hopelessly muddled. Physical
takings-demolishing homes to build a freeway-are easy to recognize.2" For scholars, lawyers, judges, and at least a generation of
law students, the far more vexing question has been whether government regulation-say, an environmental protection statute limiting new construction of residential homes in coastal areasamounts to a taking when it diminishes the value of private property.245 In classic discussions of the takings divide, Professors Bruce
Ackerman and Frank Michelman suggested that physical takings
are a personal, demoralizing violation of one's property rights,"6
while regulatory takings amount to a less demoralizing loss of mar'"The major questions are the measure of compensation and now the meaning of
laws defining "public use" that were enacted after Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005). See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100, 2114 (2009) (arguing that most of the laws
passed by state legislatures in response to Kelo "are likely to impose few, if any,
meaningful restrictions on economic-development takings"). Somin cites a Texas law,
that, among other things, excludes takings that are "merely a pretext to confer a private benefit" from the definition of a "public use," as one such ineffectual law. Id. at
2135-36.
245 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (answering in
the affirmative, provided that the taking "deprives land of all economically beneficial
use," and that such limitations were not "part of [the landowner's] title to begin
with"). The question of regulatory takings is a muddle because it reflects dueling traditions of property as wealth and as a basis for civic responsibility. See Rose, supra
note 56, at 588-91.
6See Radin, supra note 19, at 1003 n.166 (citing Bruce Ackerman, Private Property
and the Constitution 129-34 (1977)) ("[Ackerman] claims he can thus explain.., why
is it that six-figure losses imposed by zoning regulations will go uncompensated, while
seizure of a one-acre plot of unused gravel patch will be compensated .. . ."); cf.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1201-02 n.77 (1967)
(noting in the context of nuisance law that "if, after restrictions are imposed, the
owner retains a significant latitude for choice about his property's destiny" so "he can
feel himself imprinting his will or personality on that property's future-then it may
be said that critical value has been preserved").
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ginal wealth. A personhood perspective explains why: "Object-loss
is more important than wealth-loss," wrote Margaret Jane Radin,
"because object-loss is specially related to personhood in a way
that wealth-loss is not., 24 7 Nevertheless, over the last twenty-five
years, the Supreme Court has become far more aggressive about
requiring compensation for regulatory takings.248 And the last several years have been particularly energetic ones for political
movements seeking to redefine most land-use controls as takings,
with property rights ballot measures going to a vote in seven Western states since 2004.249 While critics have regarded these movements as more "astroturf" than grassroots, funded by big developers and agricultural landowners,250 the property rights movement
would not have gained the traction it did without a broader, more
intuitive appeal.
The opposition to regulation suggests that the distinction between object-loss and wealth-loss is an incomplete account of personhood in takings cases. Regulation is not just a curb on the right
to use, which is closely linked to personhood, but there is also arguably a loss of personhood when the government proscribes a
noxious use: the personhood that arises from foisting externalities
upon others. As in nuisance contexts, these noxious activities can
become synonymous with ownership and personhood; after all, the
only reason people think they can get away with doing such things
247Radin,

supra note 19, at 1004. The "diminution of value" test that courts com-

monly consider in determining whether a regulation constitutes a taking suggests that
there is a point at which wealth-loss becomes as demoralizing as object-loss.
'4See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389 (1994) (protecting a property
owner's "right to just compensation" if the government demands any part of her
property "for a public purpose"); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 102 (requiring compensation
unless the regulation is grounded in nuisance law); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (prohibiting the "obtaining of an easement to serve some
valid governmental purpose" when done "without payment of compensation").
24.
Anti-regulation initiatives went on the ballots of seven Western states, passing
only in Oregon and Arizona. Somin, supra note 244, at 2144. Oregon's Measure 37,
enacted in 2004, was later repealed in large part by a 2007 ballot measure (Measure
49) that "limits some of the development that Measure 37 permitted." Measure 49,
Clatsop County Oregon: Land Use Planning, available at http://www.co.clatsop.or.us/
default.asp?pageid=558&deptid=12
(last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
250
See, e.g., Hannah Jacobs, Note, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the
2006 Takings Initiatives, 116 Yale L.J. 1518, 1526 (2007) (noting that "in Washington,
state and county farm bureaus and individual owners of farms, dairies, and orchards
provided approximately 59% of the funding" for a failed post-Kelo initiative).
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and externalizing the costs is because they own their property and
believe they can use it however they want.25'
Years of objections by neighbors and attempts by agencies and
other bodies to outlaw the conduct can make owners more committed to the activities, and the activities become more connected
to their status as owners, citizens, and individuals. Cessation would
not only be a surrender, but an admission of wrongdoing. Although
broader and more abstract than the injuries that give so much
pleasure for so many nuisance defendants, societal externalities are
something that many Americans embrace as part of their political
identity.252 For some people, polluting is status affirming.253 And it
bonds people to their property. Regulation does not simply lower
one's net worth. It takes something that defines people as individuals and as owners.
Recent decisions that have sought to clarify takings doctrine,
both receptive and hostile to regulation, have heightened the wide-

"' Cf. Joseph William Singer, How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of
Ownership, in Property and Community 57 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M.
Pefialver eds., 2010). I have a different take on externalities-property law and norms
do not simply recognize (and condemn) some and obscure (and allow) others. Rather,
they foster awareness that one's conduct produces externalities, but allow an owner to
do them anyway.
2 An unscientific survey of the blogosphere suggests there is widespread sentiment,
or at least a market for hyperbolic satire proclaiming, as one cyber-sage did, that "gas
is for guzzling.., all i know is i like to take my hummer for two tank drives and enjoy
polluting its my right to pollute i have the money to pollute god bless gasoline yes."
See Bombaytearooms, who cares about the GM volt i love my gas guzzler,
Thoughts.com (Aug. 12, 2009), http://bit.ly/qD1Atg; cf. The Gallant Asthmatic, If I
didn't have asthma I'd probably smoke, Hardluck Asthma (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://bit.ly/qd0otl ("I love going outside blowing snow with my snow blower at 7 a.m.
in the morning when it's five degrees above zero, with the engine roaring at a decibel
loud enough for everyone in the neighborhood to enjoy. I love that it puts fumes in
the air that I can smell. I love that it uses a ton of gas. I love polluting the air."). Tshirts and license plate frames proclaiming "I Love My Gas Guzzler" are on sale at
one retailer. I Love My Gas Guzzler Gifts, T-Shirts, Stickers & More, CafePress,
htl://shop.cafepress.com/i-love-my-gas-guzzler (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
Thousands of people each year pay a premium to eat endangered species on the
black market, and it is almost certainly not because snow leopard, ape, or elephant
tastes delicious. Anneli Rufus, Endangered Species on the Grill: The Black Market in
Illegal Meat Flourishes in the US, AlterNet (Feb. 15, 2010), http://bit.ly/9wjb4f. The
pleasure may come from the thrill of doing something illegal and in some circles may
signal wealth and power, but is also undeniably connected to the cruelty and irreversible consequence of eating a species into extinction.
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spread view of government as an oppressive outsider. 2' The rise in
hostility to regulation underscores the enormous challenge of instilling new behavioral norms and making effective environmental
policy. Perhaps, then, it reveals the pitfalls of clarity and the benefits of property's indirect approach. What Carol Rose has called
the "muddle" of ad hoc calculations seems to respect how personhood can accrete around resistance to regulation without hobbling
the ability of the government to regulate. It recognizes the validity
of individual rights while insisting that property law has to balance
them with important collective interests. In the muddle, there is
opportunity to reconcile owners to the larger compromises that
Americans have always had to make. 55
CONCLUSION: DOING DIRT

A generation of scholars has embraced the "human fulfilling"
aspects of property, but for hundreds of years, it has been possible
for Americans to identify with their land because they have been
able to hurt people in the course of acquiring and owning it. While
long associated with the most progressive values of property, personhood has a dark side, as people justify morally unacceptable
conduct by investing themselves in their land. From the beginning
of the American experience of property, personhood has cut in
multiple directions. It has been less of a progressive value in property than a challenge that the law has had to negotiate.
It might seem possible to ignore the historical link between
atrocity and personhood and focus on ways to cultivate human fulfillment in the present. But as long as people find personhood in
bad behavior as owners, property will continue to have to balance
incompatible personhood claims. Given its ambiguous valence, ignoring personhood altogether in favor of deciding property questions with other moral principles may be tempting.256 But the
American cultural investment in property is so closely tied to per254See,

e.g., Somin, supra note 39, at 1190-91 (noting that one post-Kelo survey

showed "81 to 95 percent of the public disapproved of the Supreme Court's decision,"
and a later survey "showed 71 percent of the public supported the enactment of state
laws forbidding economic development takings").
' See Rose, supra note 77, at 24-25 (detailing one such compromise after the Civil
War).
' See Radin, supra note 19, at 1010-11; Stern, Residential, supra note 52.
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sonhood that ignoring it risks moving the law too far from shared
normative assumptions about the obligations of ownership. As a
result, people may view such rules as illegitimate, or they may invest less of themselves in the land, altering their sense of ownership
in socially detrimental ways.
Progressives aspire to shape property's norms to "promote...
environmental stewardship, civic responsibility, and aggregate
wealth" and to "establish the framework for a kind of social life
' But the complex
appropriate to a free and democratic society."257
moral valence of "human flourishing" compels more sustained attention to the ways individuals might resist progressive measures as
well as the kinds of indirect approaches the law has long relied
upon to contain and channel the behavior of property owners.
When property conceives of personhood as a fact of ownership, for
pleasure and for pain, as opposed to a basis for decision, it can balance competing interests and give both sides a continuing and ultimately cooperative stake in making the system work.

..
7 Alexander et al., supra note 31, at 743-44.
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